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INTRODUCTION 
 
In our political system, the public expects its elected leaders to tell the truth. 
Casting a long shadow over the American political landscape, the U.S. Presidency is seen 
not only as the most powerful political office in the western world, but a position with the 
capacity for great moral leadership. In our contemporary political discourse, the 
promotion of alternative facts, fake news, and a general assault on the truth has 
demonstrated the importance of examining presidential credibility and the political 
consequences a president faces when he misleads the American public. Although, a 
substantial amount of academic research presently exists on issues of truthfulness within 
American politics, a great deal of that literature focuses on declining rates of overall trust 
in institutions (Pew Research Center 2015). Current scholarship does not explain the 
political consequences of presidential credibility in a comparative way.  
In this work, a comparative approach is employed to the study of presidential 
credibility. The first case study examines the domestic political implications that 
President George H.W. Bush faced after breaking his infamous 1988 campaign promise 
to not raise taxes. The second case study investigates the role that the United States 
played in removing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi during the 2011 Libyan intervention. 
This chapter evaluates the degree to which the Obama administration’s policy in Libya 
misled the American public into believing the U.S. military role was restricted to a 
humanitarian mission, rather than a classic regime change operation which ended with 
Gaddafi out of power.  
Credibility means believability. The ability of the president to be perceived as 
believable by the American public largely decides his political fate. Yet, judgments made 
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outside the realm of public opinion matter to the political fortunes of a president. Political 
elites and the media are indispensable in holding president’s accountable for their actions. 
In both the Bush and Obama case, the ability of the media to assert itself into the public 
debate and shape the country’s notion of the president’s credibility on the respective 
issues was critical to how the president was perceived and, in turn, the consequences he 
faced for his decisions.  
Throughout U.S. history, presidential success and failure has been shaped by 
public concerns over honesty and candidness. However, the issue of presidential 
credibility has arguably never been given more attention and weight than it is today. This 
work presents the reader with two case studies in how credibility problems for U.S. 
presidents locate themselves in both the domestic and foreign space.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Research Question: Under what circumstances does the president face political 
consequences for lying? 
Current academic scholarship does not thoughtfully explain the political 
consequences of presidential credibility over multiple presidential administrations. This 
project examines two case studies of presidential credibility. One case study exists in the 
domestic political realm while the other case is devoted to presidential credibility in 
foreign policy decision-making. To the extent that a credibility problem exists, this work 
hopes to expand our collective understanding of the political price U.S. president’s pay 
for misleading the American public. Political price can be evaluated by employing a 
three-pronged assessment of presidential approval ratings and/or relevant public polling 
data, measuring elite public opinion through a content analysis of editorial pieces from 
newspaper publications, and a review of other relevant publications of the time period.  
PRESIDENTIAL HONESTY & CHARACTER  
  
A great deal of existing academic literature devoted to presidential credibility 
views the issue through the lens of moral and ethical leadership (Bishin Stevens, Wilson 
2000; Goldman 1952; Pfiffner 2008; Wasserman 2010). Asking if a president can be both 
politically effective and ethical, Wasserman evaluates moral behavior as a feature of 
presidential leadership (Wasserman 2010). Assessing the performance of past presidents 
based on character, virtue, and ethics, the author provokes the question as to whether 
president’s can govern without lying (Wasserman 2010, 2). Wasserman’s argument treats 
the derelictions of past presidents as moral judgments that fail to appreciate the political 
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consequences which are undoubtedly an important component to the narrative of 
presidential credibility.  
  The complicated nature of presidential decision making often tempts presidents to 
misrepresent inconvenient truths (Galston 2010). Thompson drives at this point when he 
describes presidential honesty within the paradigm of “constitutional character” 
(Thompson 2010, 23). This concept evaluates the willingness of presidents to accept 
responsibility, tolerate opposition, and commit to candor with the public as measures of 
moral leadership (Thompson 2010). In short, the nature of this scholarship aims to 
describe presidential deception as failures in moral and ethical efficacy. 
  Whereas Thompson uses constitutional character as a means of constructing the 
virtues of presidential leadership, Galston expands on perceived distinctions between 
public and private virtue by locating presidential leadership in the context of “ethical 
realism” (Galston 2010, 99). Galston asserts that complications emerge when assessing 
presidential leadership due to the “multidimensional character of the presidential office 
and by the variety of challenges that the president confronts” (Galston 2010, 99). This 
article suggests that presidents cannot “attain or maintain power if they say what they 
believe in the bluntest possible terms” (Galston 2010, 99). The author argues that 
politicians must balance public insistence of candor with the competing desire of human 
beings for limited truths. These competing visions of presidential leadership offer 
persuasive arguments for both good moral character as well as presidential morality 
tempered by realism (Galston 2010). Having said that, the limited explanation of the 
political effect that the misrepresentation of truth has on presidential governing restricts a 
meaningful discussion of how it affects a president’s credibility. 
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CREDIBILITY & LYING  
Presidents can never entirely level with the American people. As Richard Nixon 
said in his post-presidency years, there is an “importance and necessity of secrecy in the 
performance of the presidential role” (Wilson 2015, 59). However, several academics 
have argued that there are several ways in which presidents can avoid telling the public 
the truth (Pfiffner 2008; Cannon 2007; Thompson 2010; Wilson 2015). Pfiffner offers a 
means to quantify presidential deceptions through a process of categorizing lies (Pfiffner 
2008). The author breaks presidential lies into three broad categories: justifiable lies, lies 
to prevent embarrassment (including some serious breaches of the public trust), and lies 
of policy deception (Pfiffner 2008). The thrust of his argument centers around the 
distinction between covert actions and covert policies.  
In a similar vein, Cannon focuses on the different types of lies. The author writes 
that there are “‘white lies’ told for social convenience or to spare feelings, ‘excuses’ that 
are only half true but that rationalize our own behavior, lies told during a crisis, lies told 
to liars, paternalistic lies told to those we care about, and lies told for the social good—
also known as ‘noble lies’” (Cannon 2008, 58). Noting that presidential prevarications are 
often justified in the same way as normal individuals, Cannon acknowledges the 
enormity of presidential responsibilities, which, at times, require talents not consistent 
with truthfulness (Cannon 2008). 
  In addition, Cannon also argues that the most salient lies told by U.S. presidents 
are those which seek to preserve or promote policies or actions, which the author refers to 
as governing lies (Cannon 2008). This type of lie is “more consequential, and it is by 
their consequences that they should be judged, as the American public harshly judged the 
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lies told about the Vietnam War and about Watergate” (Cannon 2008, 59). For example, 
the result of governing lies during the 1970s led to “a profound change in how much 
deceit the public—and the media—would tolerate from the Oval Office” (Cannon 2008, 
59). Similar to the scholarly work described above, Thompson is principally concerned 
with what he classifies as “institutional deception,” compared to the individual lies that 
presidents tell which are not necessarily important to the business of government 
(Thompson 2010, 23). As it relates to the different types of lies presidents tell the 
American public, Thompson locates his argument within an institutional framework that 
places an importance on the moral integrity of the presidency as an entity. 
SCHOLARSHIP ON FOREIGN POLICY DECEPTION  
  
The most significant foreign policy decision a president can make is going to war. 
In this respect, multiple academics have argued that presidential lying is most 
consequential in foreign policy decision making (Alterman 2005; Cannon 2007; Fisher 
2010; Schlesinger 1973). Yet, under false or misleading information, a president 
compromises the ability of the public to make an informed decision on a fundamental 
policy concern, which fits into the narrative of presidential credibility. Eric Alterman’s 
book on presidential deception and its consequences is grounded in this idea of a critical 
question that will decide matters of war and peace for the country (Alterman 2005). The 
author posits that the American political system operates under an “unstated assumption 
that a certain amount of presidential lying to the public by our president and other 
politicians has become a given in U.S. politics” (Alterman 2005, 4). More broadly, the 
author appears to suggest the need for presidents to lie in certain instances. The author 
focuses on “clear and unambiguous falsehood[s] to the country and to Congress regarding 
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a crucial question of war and peace” (4). Studying Franklin Roosevelt and the Yalta 
accords, John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lyndon Johnson and his 
involvement in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as well as Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy 
actions in Central America, the author situates these four “key presidential lies” in the 
context of a crucial security policy question confronting the country (4). This report 
adopts a distinct model of evaluating individual presidential lies and the broader political 
effect they have on the presidency.  
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
Academic projects devoted to understanding the U.S. presidency must balance 
demands for quantitative assessment with an historical sense of judgment, particularly as 
it relates to capturing the essence of lies and the political consequences for a president 
over time. Robert Dallek’s book Hail To The Chief: The Making and Unmaking of 
American Presidents evaluates several presidencies. The historical contextualizing of 
presidential success and failure based on notions of vision, political skill, and 
transparency is pertinent to the general thrust of this thesis (Dallek 1993). Dallek writes 
expansively on the value of presidential credibility and the president’s role as a moral 
authority that can rally the country behind a common purpose (Dallek 1993), which is 
relevant to this work when considering if that shared policy purpose was eventually 
considered a lie (lowering taxes, foreign intervention). 
  Presidential success is significantly dependent on the credibility of the 
officeholder. Stephen Skowronek and Richard E. Neustadt are widely considered the 
premiere academic scholars in studying the presidency. Yet, Skowronek and Neustadt 
possess separate notions of what shapes a successful presidency and how political 
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viability is maintained within the American system. Stephen Skowronek conceptualizes 
presidential power as the ability of a president to legitimize his actions in political time 
(Skowronek 2011). Political time can be defined as the relationship a president creates 
with existing commitments of ideology, interest, and authority (Skowronek 2011). The 
author views the political impact of presidential action and its broader implications for 
the American political system through this lens of time, writing “whether it is possible to 
observe across the broad history of leadership efforts something more systematic about 
the political impact of presidential action in time and over time” (Skowronek 2011, 23). 
From the author’s perspective, a great deal of presidential success depends on the ways in 
which a president legitimates his actions (Skowronek 2011, 23). The political time thesis 
captures unifying themes of leadership that can be applied to problems of presidential 
honesty. Moreover, a president’s capacity to legitimate statements or policy actions, 
either transparent or misleading, has a direct effect on the political consequences he may 
confront if those policy actions damage his credibility. The larger, systematic effect of 
presidential decisions on the political system over time is more impactful than the policy 
decisions of individual presidents (Skowronek 2011, 23). Connecting notions of 
deception with a president’s policy commitments is one way of modeling how political 
consequences develop during times of presidential lying. 
  Richard Neustadt’s work is a classic in understanding the individual effectiveness 
of presidents based on notions of political skill and personality. Neustadt locates 
presidential power as not only the ability to persuade and bargain, but to continuously 
evaluate the consequences that a president’s decisions will have on his future prospects 
for the exercise of power (Neustadt 1992). Neustadt’s concept of presidential leadership 
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is not only fixed in the idea of the bargaining president but borne out of the constant 
strategic balance of calculating presidential persuasion and rhetorical appeals that 
advance certain political goals (Neustadt 1992). 
 CONTRIBUTION 
  
The American public, regardless of party preference or a particular ideological 
adherence, looks to their presidents for moral guidance in times of national and political 
crisis (Goldman 1952). Voters expects a devotion to basic values by their presidents, 
which include the conveying of fundamental truths (Bishin Stevens, Wilson 2000). As 
Newman and Davis argue, perceptions of presidential greatness are largely dependent on 
the two factors of strong character and intellectual brilliance (Newman and Davis 2016). 
The authors point out that the more positive expert views of character, the higher the 
president will be rated in terms of historical judgment (Newman and Davis 2016). Yet, if 
a credibility crisis emerges as a result of presidential dishonesty, what is the larger impact 
on the presidency as an institution? 
  It is my desire to demonstrate through previous literature, a content analysis of 
editorial pieces from major American newspapers, and available public polling, how 
presidential credibility affects the political consequences of a president. A content 
analysis of newspaper editorials will afford the opportunity to determine how president 
policies that possibly constituted a credibility issue were received by political elites at the 
time. Public polling that deals with a president’s approval rating, the specific policy being 
investigated, and general surveys of believability will offer a basic understanding of how 
the American public viewed their president during times where credibility was 
questioned. In the final analysis, understanding the truth in absolute terms is impossible, 
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particularly when studying an institution as complex as the American presidency. Rather, 
the goal of this project is to close the academic void with regard to the political 
consequences presidents face when they face credibility crisis’.  
 
  
.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
“No New Taxes:” George H.W. Bush  
 
In our political system, the public expects its elected leaders to tell the truth. 
Casting a long shadow over the American political landscape, many argue that the U.S. 
presidency is viewed not only as the most powerful political office in the western world, 
but a position with the capacity for great moral leadership. Consequently, when our 
presidents do not tell the truth or are less than transparent in their ultimate policy aims, 
what political consequences do they face? A presidential lie can be defined as knowingly 
making a false statement, either with the explicit intention that the statement be believed 
as true or with previous knowledge that a statement cannot be supported by fact 
(Alterman 2005). This chapter examines the “no new taxes” pledge that President George 
H.W. Bush made in the 1988 presidential campaign. As a result of his campaign promise 
and the ultimate policy commitments which violated “no new taxes,” to what extent did 
President Bush pay a political price for misleading the American public? The methods 
employed to define political price are an analysis of elite political opinion, polling, and 
the inclusion of additional primary sources (interviews, historical research, etc.). 
Ultimately, this work seeks to answer the deeper question of the meaningful political 
implications that emerge when American presidents do not tell the truth.  
Vice President George H.W. Bush’s campaign pledge not to raise taxes began 
during the Republican primary season and was widely aired in television advertisements 
as well as candidate appearances in several early primaries (Shaw 2014). Facing the 
political reality of conservatism in which tax-cutting was a central policy principle, Bush 
understood the purist worldview of Republicanism in the Reagan era that rejected deficit 
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reduction through spending cuts and tax revenue increases (Meacham 2015). Beginning 
in the Republican primary in early 1988, Bush sought to make the subject of rejecting tax 
increases an issue of presidential leadership and character. In that vein, his commitment 
to lowering taxes, or at least maintaining existing personal rates, would be an extension 
of his political credibility as a president governing in a conservative age. A rising 
Mississippi politician who came to the United States Senate the same year George 
Herbert Walker Bush was elected president, Republican Trent Lott said that he thought 
Bush was fully committed to keeping taxes at existing rates. “I believe he thought he 
could keep this promise. And a lot of us Republicans in the Congress expected him to do 
so. He campaigned on it and many of us believed his credibility was at stake. We firmly 
believed in this policy too” (author interview [hereinafter referred to as “Lott 
interview”]). However, the responsibilities of governing would test Bush’s political 
commitment. Likewise, the president’s ultimate breaking of his pledge would challenge a 
fragile political coalition between the White House and congressional conservatives who 
believed the Bush administration was too moderate for their brand of Republicanism.  
BACKGROUND 
 
In the 1980s, annual deficits and a ballooning national debt was setting the United 
States’ fiscal policy on an untenable trajectory (Greenspan 2008). In 1987, Yale historian 
Paul Kennedy penned a bestselling work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: 
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, which asserted that 
uncontrollable debt and the economic leveraging of great powers was a direct result of 
their decline (Kennedy 1987). In 1980, the national debt stood at over $900 billion (U.S. 
Treasury Figures). By the time President Reagan left office in January 1989, the debt was 
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slightly under $3 trillion (U.S. Treasury Figures). Kennedy’s thesis was in the minds of 
economic policymakers who were concerned that the tripling of the national debt 
between fiscal years 1980 and 1989 was a harbinger to American economic decline in the 
world (Meacham 2015). Yet, while Bush was committing himself to running on a 
conservative platform for the presidential nomination, he understood from a policy 
position that the nation’s political leaders would have to confront the country’s 
unsustainable fiscal path (Meacham 2015). This required spending reductions and 
revenue increases for long-term deficit control. 1However, Bush was the vice-president to 
a man whose presidential ambitions had been propelled by non-traditional economic 
theories (Meacham 2015). One could argue that Bush understood his political attraction 
rested on appealing to the conservative activist branch of the Republican Party, which 
believed low tax rates and minimal regulatory oversight generated economic growth. In 
time, existing political commitments and the responsibilities of governing would force a 
decision on the growing deficit problem. 
 
RACE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
The first time Bush employ’s the issue of taxes as a political weapon was during 
the primary season in New Hampshire in both television advertisements and candidate 
appearances (Walsh 1988). He understood that he had to consolidate the support of the 
conservative right, which had propelled Ronald Reagan’s candidacy to the White House 
eight years earlier, in order to win the Republican nomination (Meacham 2015). Facing 
                                                 
1 “Slaying the Dragon of Debt: Fiscal Politics and Policy from the 1970s to the Present.” 1990 Budget Enforcement Act. University of 
California, Berkeley. The Bancroft Library. [Hereinafter referred to as “Slaying the Dragon of Debt: Fiscal Politics and Policy from 
the 1970s to the Present.”] 
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Kansas Senator Bob Dole, Bush leveled an effective advertising assault against Dole in 
which he portrayed the senator as a prevaricator who could not stand his ground against 
tax increases (Fletcher 1996). Airing a week before the New Hampshire primary on 16 
February 1988, the advertising spot labeled Dole as “Senator Straddle,” branding him as 
an unprincipled politician who could not be trusted with upholding conservative 
principles when it came to tax policy (Smith 2007). The thrust of Bush’s campaign ad 
accused Dole of refusing to sign a pledge opposing new taxes (Fletcher 1996). 
Acknowledging that his presidential ambitions had collapsed, Dole subsequently ended 
his campaign for president on March 29, 1988 (Meacham 2015). Years later, when asked 
if Bush’s advertising campaign damaged his candidacy, Dole responded, “it really hurt” 
(Smith 2007). The former Senate majority leader added that the “Senator Straddle” spot 
along with Bush’s more personal campaign style in New Hampshire hampered Dole’s 
own credibility as a conservative in an increasingly conservative political environment 
(Smith 2007). At last, the Bush camp had witnessed the potency of using the issue of 
taxes as a political weapon.  
By the time the primary campaign concluded in the late spring of 1988, Bush’s 
team needed an effective strategy heading into the general election. In July of 1988, as 
Bush was the presumed nominee of the Republican Party, a public opinion poll showed 
that thirty-eight percent of voters preferred Bush, while fifty-five percent favored the 
Democratic nominee, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts (Gallup). Bush had to 
change the state of his polling. Describing his campaign strategy against Dukakis a month 
earlier in his personal diary, Bush wrote that “it will be easy to paint him for what he 
truly is—a Massachusetts liberal” (Meacham 2015). In this fashion, Bush’s attacks on 
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Dukakis’s economic policies, principally that the liberal Dukakis was more willing to 
raise taxes, would be central to his campaign platform.  
The 1988 Republican National Convention was the venue in which Bush most 
prominently displayed his campaign promise of rejecting any tax increase measures. In 
his acceptance speech on August 18, 1988, Bush proclaimed, “I'm the one who will not 
raise taxes. My opponent now says he'll raise them as a last resort or a third resort. When 
a politician talks like that, you know that's one resort he'll be checking into.2 Bush 
continued, “[m]y opponent won't rule out raising taxes, but I will, and the Congress will 
push me to raise taxes, and I'll say no, and they'll push, and I'll say no, and they'll push 
again, and I'll say to them.”3 The most famous phrase from Bush’s speech entered the 
American political lexicon in which the Republican presidential nominee proudly 
declared, “‘Read my lips: no new taxes.’”4 This line from Bush’s speech establishes the 
fact that he was basing his political credibility as a conservative politician on a policy 
promise of not raising taxes. While this political pledge was most vocally expressed by 
Bush in his acceptance speech, the 1988 Republican Party platform also made opposition 
towards additional tax measures a central feature of their plank.5 Under the section titled 
“Reducing the Burden of Taxes,” the party platform stated that “[w]e oppose any 
attempts to increase taxes. Tax increases harm the economic expansion and reverse the 
trend to restoring control of the economy to individual Americans.”6 Thus, it was not 
only Bush who made this promise, but official Republican Party policies that defined 
                                                 
2 John Woolley and Gerhard Peters. Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New 
Orleans. The American Presidency Project. University of California, Santa Barbara. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. Since 1999. 
[Hereinafter referred to as “Republican Convention Speech 1988.”]  
3 Republican Convention Speech 1988. 
4 Republican Convention Speech 1988 
5 The American Presidency Project. August 16, 1988. “Republican Party Platform of 1988.” Political Party Platforms. University of 
California, Santa Barbara. [Hereinafter referred to as “Republican Party Platform of 1988.”] 
6 Republican Convention Speech 1988.  
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credibility as keeping taxes at existing levels.7 In this regard, the party plank 
demonstrates that both Bush and the Republican Party had in part established a political 
coalition premised on maintaining low tax rates.  
METHODOLOGY 
 The polling data used for this project was accessed using the Roper Center iPoll 
online database through Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut. The search terms 
consisted of Bush, Dukakis, taxes, spending, deficit, debt, credibility, leadership, and lie. 
In several instances, key search terms were paired together to produce new archival 
items. The historical time frame applied to the search of these polls was January 1998, 
which marked the beginning of the 1988 presidential campaign, to July 1990, which was 
the general date in which Bush reversed his policy on taxes.  
Polling data suggests that Bush’s campaign promise of opposing new taxes had an 
impact on public perceptions as to which candidate would most likely raise taxes. To the 
extent that polling data can confirm that voters saw Bush’s “no new taxes” plan as a 
definitive policy promise, the data included within this project demonstrates that his 
statements, at least, resonated with the electorate. For example, a CBS News Poll 
conducted between July 31 and August 3, 1988, which was before Bush’s convention 
speech, asked respondents, “Do you think it is more likely that taxes would be raised in a 
Bush administration, or in a Dukakis administration, or isn't there likely to be any 
difference when it comes to raising taxes” (CBS News Poll). Nine percent answered 
Bush, twenty-seven percent said Dukakis, and fifty-five percent said there would be no 
difference (CBS News Poll). This eighteen-point gap divide between Bush and Dukakis 
                                                 
7 Republican Party Platform of 1988. 
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would only grow over time. However, after Bush’s nomination, the same poll suggested 
his acceptance speech had a slight impact on how voters measured each candidates’ 
commitment to the politically salient tax issue (Woolley and Peters). That poll, conducted 
again between August 19-21, which was one day after Bush’s acceptance speech in New 
Orleans, revealed that Bush had lowered voter concerns about the possibility of revenue 
increases from nine percent to eight percent (CBS News Poll). Contrastingly, thirty-four 
percent of respondents now thought Dukakis was more likely to raise taxes when 
compared to Bush, marking a seven-point negative increase on this question for the 
Massachusetts governor in less than three weeks and a 26-point overall gap between the 
two candidates (CBS News Poll).  
This number subsided slightly over the next month, as evidenced by a new CBS 
News Poll in early September 1988, which asked the same question. In this poll, ten 
percent of respondents thought Bush was more likely to raise taxes, thirty percent 
answered Dukakis, followed by fifty-two percent responding that it made no difference 
and eight percent expressing no answer (CBS News Poll). This twenty-point gap between 
the Bush and Dukakis reinforced earlier findings which found that voter opinion 
substantially favored Bush over Dukakis throughout the entire general election campaign. 
In addition, if a correlation exists between Bush’s nominating speech and public opinion 
as to which candidate was more likely to raises taxes, which is plausible considering that 
the CBS News polls were completed during the same time of Bush’s convention speech, 
it is fair to also argue that Bush did not substantially change voter opinion on where he 
stood on taxes. Instead, these polls suggest that while voter opinion changed minimally as 
it relates to Bush’s position, the effect was that voters saw Dukakis as more likely to raise 
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taxes, thus shaping public opinion of him in the closing days of the campaign based in 
large part on the issue of taxes. Expanding on this assumption also suggests that Bush’s 
promise not to raise taxes resonated with the electorate by establishing his political 
credibility on the salient campaign issue of taxes. In short, the public had responded 
approvingly to Bush’s unequivocal commitment to maintaining tax rates at existing 
levels.  
A similar poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times throughout September and 
October of 1988 leading up to the election also reinforces this argument. Asking “which 
one (of the 1988 presidential candidates) do you think would do the best job of holding 
down taxes: Michael Dukakis or George Bush—or haven't you heard enough about that 
yet to say,” the first poll in this series, conducted between September 9-11, revealed that 
forty-three percent said Bush, compared to twenty-six percent for Dukakis with sixty-
nine percent of respondents either refusing to answer or claiming they had not heard 
enough. The second poll, performed between September 23-25, demonstrated that 
Dukakis had gone from twenty-six percent to eighteen percent of respondents saying he 
would most likely do the best job of holding down taxes (Los Angeles Times Poll). 
Contrastingly, Bush had dramatically increased his standing in this poll from forty-three 
percent to fifty-nine percent in less than two weeks (Los Angeles Times Poll). A 
September 29 poll surveying 622 registered voters revealed a slight uptick for Dukakis 
from eighteen percent to twenty-one percent of voters viewing him more favorably on 
this issue, compared to Bush cementing a fifty-three percent rating among respondents 
believing he would do the best job of holding taxes down (Los Angeles Times Poll). The 
same poll conducted between October 11-13 showed twenty-three percent of voters now 
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viewed Dukakis favorably on keeping taxes down while Bush maintained a commanding 
double-digit lead with forty-eight percent of voters continuing to express confidence in 
his ability to keep taxes down (Los Angeles Times Poll). The Los Angeles Times polls 
appear to suggest that public opinion of the tax issue experienced dramatic swings in 
Bush’s favor. In turn, these polls indicate that Bush’s relentless message of “read my 
lips” sunk into the political consciousness of the American public, which identified it as a 
definitive promise. In other words, Bush’s political credibility, especially among 
conservative republicans, was directly tied to him not raising rates. Nevertheless, the Los 
Angeles Times polling data incorporated into this work reveals that Bush’s repeated 
claims that his administration would not raise taxes had an effect on how voters assessed 
each candidate in terms of their policy commitments.  
DEMOCRATIC REFLECTIONS 
 
Michael Dukakis reflected on Bush’s campaign pledge of not raising taxes. Sitting 
at the kitchen table in his Brookline, Massachusetts home, Dukakis said that “he [Bush] 
obviously didn’t mean it. I mean, during the 1980s, the U.S. government was running 
massive deficits with no end in sight. It was terrible” (author interview [hereinafter 
referred to as “Dukakis Interview”]). Asked whether he ever had any personal 
conversations with Bush about his “no new taxes” pledge, Dukakis indicated that he had 
tried to convince Bush privately that tackling the deficit needed to be a federal priority. 
“It was after the election and I had to go to Washington for some business as governor. 
Bush calls me, he’s already been elected president, and he asks if I can meet him at the 
Vice-Presidential Residence. And so, I agree” (Dukakis Interview). Dukakis describes the 
meeting at the Naval Observatory, in which he expresses shock at the candid exchange 
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the two former opponents have over the fiscal state of the country. “I tell him, ‘you have 
to do something about the deficit, it’s out of control,’ and he agrees. I explain to him that 
we had a very successful program in Massachusetts while I was governor, a revenue 
enforcement program that could be a successful model for the nation. I encouraged him 
to consider a program like that. Bush responds that he’ll give this information to Jimmy 
[Baker], but that he can’t deal on taxes for the first year” (Dukakis Interview). Dukakis 
recalls being startled by the president-elect’s response, particularly because Bush’s 
promise to never raising taxes was foundational to his political message during the race. 
“The deficit problem was certainly in the minds of all of us at the time, especially if you 
were in politics. And Bush had made his whole campaign about not raising taxes. To say 
that a discussion had to be delayed for a year suggested to me it was not something he 
was serious about” (Dukakis Interview). Pressed if Bush’s pledge, which he ultimately 
broke, could be considered a lie, Dukakis responded by saying that “[i]f you make a 
political promise that is completely contradictory to your own values, don’t be surprised 
if you fail. That’s what happened with Bush. He made a temporary promise in ’88 that he 
couldn’t possibly keep. And he knew that” (Dukakis Interview). Governor Dukakis’ 
claim that Bush’s pledge was temporary provokes the question as to if “read my lips” can 
be considered a lie. Does making a promise that one knows they cannot keep constitute a 
lie? The definition outlined earlier, which interprets a lie as “knowingly making a false 
statement” would suggest that a temporary promise made while understanding the 
economic facts that undercut such a claim indicates a lie.  
INITIAL PUBLIC SKEPTICISM 
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While polling data maintains that voters believed Bush would do a better job at 
keeping taxes down, surveys performed before and after the election also suggests that a 
sizeable portion of registered voters felt Bush would not ultimately keep his pledge. This 
dynamic is compelling seeing that voters were more compelled to vote for Bush based on 
this policy position, but also suspected early on that the Republican nominee could not 
keep his long-repeated promise. For example, a poll taken between October 23-26 asked 
respondents if they believed George Bush when he said he would not permit any new 
taxes or if he might accept new taxes (NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll). While 
twenty-one percent of respondents said they believed him when he said he would not 
allow new taxes, seventy-one percent answered that he might accept new taxes, along 
with eight-percent responding that they were not sure (NBC News/Wall Street Journal 
Poll). These numbers remained virtually unchanged in a similarly-worded poll after Bush 
was elected with twenty-two percent responding that they believed he would not accept 
new taxes, seventy-one percent answering that they did not believe he could maintain this 
pledge, and seven percent answering that they were not sure (NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll). However, a survey conducted three-months into Bush’s presidency exposed 
more intensely the American public’s suspicion that Bush could not keep his promise of 
no new taxes. That poll, conducted between April 22-25, revealed that seventy-five 
percent of voters believed Bush would ask for new taxes despite his pledge (NBC 
News/Wall Street Journal). Only nineteen percent thought he would never ask for new 
taxes and six percent answered that they were not sure (NBC News/Wall Street Journal).  
REPUBLICAN REFLECTIONS 
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The problem that Bush faced was a Democratic-controlled Congress that would 
not accept tax rates at existing levels if spending reductions, particularly in entitlement 
programs, were the only negotiable budgetary dimension. Hollis McLoughlin, who 
served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury from 1989 to 1993, told this author that 
congressional Democrats had no real plan to negotiate on the budget with the White 
House in 1990. “The democratic congress had no interest in a negotiated settlement on 
the budget. They were determined for him [Bush] to break his pledge. They wanted him 
to raise taxes, so they could frame this as ‘Bush breaking his campaign promise’” (author 
interview [hereinafter referred to as “McLoughlin Interview”]). McLoughlin described 
the behind-the-scenes negotiations on the budget with members of Congress. “We 
originally had an agreement for spending cuts as well as revenue increases. Our originally 
plan, which was hammered out at the famous summit at Andrews Air Force Base, had 
deeper spending cuts than the deal we ultimately agreed to with congressional leaders” 
(McLoughlin Interview). This summit, which both Democrats and Republicans attended 
and was part of a larger effort by the White House, as McLoughlin says, “to get everyone 
off campus, away from staffers, and come to an agreement,” ultimately failed 
(McLoughlin Interview). However, the failure was just as much a result of Democratic 
resistance to anything short of including revenue increases as it was to congressional 
conservatives reneging on the budget deal. “After we had reached this agreement, [Newt] 
Gingrich went back to his caucus and told them the plan, they rejected it,” McLoughlin 
continues, adding, “that made it more difficult as Democrats then pushed for additional 
revenue increases” (McLoughlin Interview).   
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Trent Lott, who was serving in his first term in the Senate, confirmed this 
account. “Newt and Vin [Weber] were hardline. I was not happy with the agreement, but 
we had to deal with the deficit. It was people in the House who ultimately broke this deal 
up” (Lott Interview). In an oral history project with presidential historian Richard Norton 
Smith, Senator Dole corroborates this account of the initial budget agreement that 
conservatives ultimately broke up. “And [Newt] Gingrich. I think they shot down the first 
deal, and then there was a second deal, which I’ve heard described as worse than the first 
deal in terms of spending controls. If there ever had been a time when you were entitled 
to say, “I told you so,” that would have been it” (Smith 2007). 
However, Senator Lott also criticized Bush’s economic advisors for pressuring 
him to agree to the settlement in the first place. “I think his budget people convinced him 
he needed to do something about this budget. I think he thought he was being courageous 
in agreeing to a tax hike when his confidantes were, in reality, misleading him. I think he 
was misled by David Stockman*8 and Dick Darman [Office of Management and Budget 
Director] who were his budget people. He was pushed into a deal with George Mitchell 
and the Democrats” (Lott Interview). While not included in the scope of this thesis, 
Secretary McLoughlin also suggests that preparations for a war with Iraqi dictator 
Saddam Hussein over his invasion of Kuwait applied additional pressure on Bush to 
come to an agreement as he knew unexpected defense expenditures were likely in the 
months ahead.  
“That’s a dimension that is often lost in this debate. State department 
policymakers expressed their frustration with launching a war in the Middle East absent 
                                                 
8 *David Stockman served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget in Ronald Reagan’s administration.  
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an agreement on the budget question. The only reason to address the Gulf War is to also 
place Bush breaking his pledge into that context to understand what he was dealing with 
as an American president” (McLoughlin Interview). 
 McLoughlin argues that developing events in the Middle East compelled the 
president to come to an agreement sooner rather than later. “Democratic leaders [in 
Congress] were determined, because of the accelerated possibility of conflict with Iraq in 
Kuwait, to have him agree to a budget that had less spending cuts than originally 
conceived and tax increases. And Bush, being the fighter pilot during World War II, shot 
out of the sky at 18, was not going to put troops on the ground without a negotiated 
settlement on the budget" (McLoughlin Interview).  
THE BUDGET DEAL 
 
The legislation which ultimately marked President George H.W. Bush’s breaking 
of his 1988 campaign pledge was the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.9 The budget deal, 
which was part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, created limits for 
discretionary spending and implemented a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) model. “Pay-as-
you-go” mandated that spending increases be matched with revenue increases to either 
produce a deficit-neutral or deficit-reducing budget over a five-year fiscal period.10 Bush 
ultimately signed this legislation in October 1991, which included an increase in the top 
marginal tax rate from twenty-eight to thirty-one percent and an increase in the individual 
alternative minimum tax rate from 21 to 24 percent. (The Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990). The bill also increased the fuel tax by 5 cents per gallon (The Tax Policy Center). 
On the spending side, $324 billion over a five-year period was cut from discretionary 
                                                 
9 Slaying the Dragon of Debt: Fiscal Politics and Policy from the 1970s to the Present. 
10 “Slaying the Dragon of Debt: Fiscal Politics and Policy from the 1970s to the Present. 
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spending, which included cuts in Medicare and other entitlement programs (Congress and 
the Nation). In total, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 projected a deficit reduction of 
$496 billion over a five-year period (Congress and the Nation).  
There were compelling reasons for Bush to reach an agreement. Chief among 
them was reducing the deficit and the debt. Having said that, discouraging economic 
developments on the horizon called for action. First, the business cycle was working 
against him (Meacham 2015). A recession early in the Reagan presidency followed by 
several years of economic expansion contributed to an exploding national debt attributed 
to an unwillingness among lawmakers to adequately raise taxes in the 1980s (Meacham 
2015). As Bush assumed office in 1989, slower economic growth meant decreased tax 
revenues and, in turn, a greater deficit (Meacham 2015). Widespread expectations by 
economists at the time suggested a looming recession in either 1990 or 1991 (Walsh 
1993). Compounding this problem were the challenges imposed by the savings and loan 
crisis of the late 1980s, which was projected to cost the U.S. government several hundred 
billion dollars (Silk 1990). The crisis ultimately cost taxpayers $125 billion (Curry and 
Shibut). Although President Bush initially threatened a veto of any budget deal that 
included an increase in taxes in early 1990, a provision within an earlier legislative piece, 
known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, authorized across-the-board spending cuts up to 
$100 billion if Congress failed to produce a budget.11 In short, Bush had to come to terms 
with this economic problem not as a candidate appealing to his party’s base, but as a 
president who was elected to govern.  
                                                 
11 “Slaying the Dragon of Debt: Fiscal Politics and Policy from the 1970s to the Present.  
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Ultimately, several of the people spoken to for this project describe the political 
fallout as a result of conservative republicans failing to back the president’s decision. 
Governor Dukakis contends that it was a conservative backlash against Bush which 
ultimately produced the damaging political consequences for the policy reversal. “It hurt 
him badly for his race for reelection,” saying that “it was [Pat] Buchanan who really 
whacked him on it during the primary. This was a classic case of politician’s not keeping 
their word” (Dukakis Interview). Asked how Bush’s breaking of his campaign promise 
situates itself into a more general discussion of presidential deception, Governor Dukakis 
suggests that Bush’s ultimate decision was deceptive. “I certainly didn’t endorse his 
public position during the campaign, which he outlined more definitively in his 
convention speech. But it was classic case because, A, he raised taxes and B, because he 
broke his promise. And it hurt him because conservatives didn’t go along with him on it” 
(Dukakis Interview). Trent Lott, who ultimately became Senate majority leader in 1996, 
expressed disappointment with President Bush’s decision. "Most republicans and the 
leadership were not happy with this. We really felt like he broke his word. But every 
president has to come to terms with the reality of governing” (Lott Interview). 
However, Senator Lott also suggests that the parameters used to define a lie are 
particularly important in the case of “read my lips.” “Did he make a promise that he knew 
he couldn’t keep at the time? That would be a lie. I don’t know if he did that. I truly 
believe he meant it when he said it. I was there in New Orleans at the [1988 Republican] 
convention when he said it” (Lott Interview). Discussing the impact of Bush’s decision 
on his presidential credibility, Secretary McLoughlin indicates that the rhetoric of “no 
new taxes” prevented policymakers from interpreting the presidents promise more 
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widely. "The political imperative was that this was great rhetoric. I would contend that 
the pledge meant that everybody, including conservatives, could get behind no taxes. And 
that meant no taxes, period. But it completely jammed any discussion of revenue 
increases from a policy position" (McLoughlin Interview). However, Secretary 
McLoughlin also admits that “it had a significant impact on him in terms of his 
credibility” (McLoughlin Interview).  
ELITE POLITICAL OPINION  
 
A content analysis of editorial pieces from major publishers sets the context for 
elite reaction relating to Bush’s breaking of his 1988 campaign promise. Editorials from 
January 1990 to January 1991 from The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and 
The New York Times provides sufficient ideological cover of the political spectrum. In 
turn, this interpretation of elite political opinion offers a glimpse into how the fourth 
estate perceived the president’s credibility before and after he made the decision to 
support a tax increase within the framework of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.  
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
 
The inclusion of The Wall Street Journal in this analysis serves to represent the 
elite political opinion of a conservative newspaper and their interpretation of the Bush 
saga as it relates to “read my lips.” Moreover, this content analysis of The Wall Street 
Journal’s editorial pieces focusing on Bush’s policy reversal appears to locate frustration 
with the president’s inability to push a capital gains tax cut through the Congress. 
Throughout the entire budget battle, which ultimately ends with Bush agreeing to raise 
taxes in exchange for spending reductions, the Journal demonstrates a clear and 
consistent policy preference for a capital gains tax cut. For example, a 5 January editorial 
suggests that the president’s elevated popularity as a result of the successful Panama 
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invasion should be leveraged to submit a capital gains tax cut to the Congress (“A 
Panama Dividend?”). Similarly, a June 27 editorial, a few days after President Bush 
announces his support for a tax increase, asks the question as to how tax revenue 
increases are plausible without a tax increase (“Lip Reading”). The editorial promotes the 
idea that this raising of funds could be facilitated through a tax cut in capital gains. This 
type of rhetoric appears to fit the mold of prevailing economic philosophy among 
conservatives at the time which favored tax cuts as a way of stimulating economic growth 
and additional revenues. The Journal’s focus on the issue of tax cuts for capital gains 
never fully dissipates. In fact, an August 9, 1990 WSJ editorial attacks the Bush 
administration for its over eagerness for a budget summit at the expense of destroying the 
possibility for a capital gains cut, which the paper argues would stimulate the economy 
and ultimately begin to address the deficit problem (“The Summit Recession”).  
While a great deal of attention is devoted to promoting the Journal’s fiscal 
position on capital gains during this time frame, a few editorials concentrate on the 
political consequences of Bush’s decision to raise taxes. A June 28 editorial by the 
Journal concedes that tax increases are ultimately necessary for federal deficit control but 
goes on to criticize the Democratic Party for excessive celebrating due to Bush breaking 
his pledge (“Lipping It Up”). The editorial piece suggests that the Democratic Party 
exists only to raise taxes. A few days later, on July 2, the Journal runs an editorial with 
the title “Mr. Bush’s Leadership,” which attacks the president for breaking his campaign 
pledge (“Mr. Bush’s Leadership”). The paper argues that the political consequences of 
Bush’s reversal are a “disillusioned” electorate that needs evidence that taxation will 
produce economic benefits for the fiscal maintenance of the country (“Mr. Bush’s 
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Leadership”). On July 3, an editorial describes the budget negotiations between the 
president and congressional leadership while also calling attention to demonstrations in 
Trenton, New Jersey against the tax increase proposals (“Read Our Lips”). However, a 
week later, the Journal returns to opining on the market consequences of the proposed 
tax increase. A July 10 editorial describes the implications of a stock-transfer tax, which 
seems to heighten speculation as to what type of tax Bush is considering (“A Lead 
Balloon”). This editorial concludes that uncertainty and a general lack of confidence in 
the president’s leadership is leading to less efficiency in the marketplace and, in turn, 
decreased revenue as a result of fewer stock market trades (“A Lead Balloon”). After this 
point, The Wall Street Journal’s editorials as it relates to President Bush’s decision 
become increasingly critical. For example, an editorial published on August 2 equates 
Bush’s marketing campaign for revenues increases with that of Coca-Cola’s introduction 
of the “new” coke, a marketing strategy which ultimately turned out to be a disaster 
(“Coca-Cola Classic”).  
Over the next couple of months, The Wall Street Journal does not publish any 
editorials which explicitly examine the president’s decision to break his campaign pledge. 
Instead, the paper outlines what it refers to as a pro-growth plan ahead of the president’s 
1991 State of the Union Address on 13 December (“A Pro-Growth Program”). This is in 
keeping with the Journal’s insistence that a capital gains cut would boost economic 
growth and begin to chip away at the deficit. In summary, to the extent that The Wall 
Street Journal challenges President Bush’s credibility during this time, it is located in the 
conservative paper’s frustration with his unwillingness or inability to push a capital gains 
cut and a general disinterest in representing the business communities interest in the tax 
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debate. Having said that, elite opinion from this source does seem to be significantly 
shaped by the lie, but rather reveals a general ideological distaste for the specifics of the 
policy change itself.  
THE WASHINGTON POST  
 
It is clear that The Washington Post was more critical in terms of Bush’s 
presidential leadership both before and after he breaks his campaign pledge. In several 
editorials, the paper situates Bush’s reluctance to address the deficit problem with higher 
tax rates into the broader context of his credibility as a responsible steward of the 
country’s fiscal future. For example, a January 21 piece by the Post describes the 
president as wanting it both ways with lower tax rates and lower interest rates even in the 
face of continual federal deficits and slower economic growth (“Toy Store Economics”). 
A February 5 editorial by the Post challenges the notion that the president’s fiscal plan of 
restraining tax increases is preserving personal savings (“... And Tax-Cut Folly”). In a 
similar vein, the next editorial appears three months later with the title “Read His 
Ellipses,” which suggests that the president’s campaign promise of no new taxes is fading 
as the administration comes to terms with the deficit (“Read His Ellipses”).  
While the Post is arguably more critical in tone and content compared to The New 
York Times or The Wall Street Journal, the paper does indicate its approval of the 
president’s policy change in a few editorial pieces. This only further demonstrates that 
the paper expressed a clear policy preference for increased taxes to deal with the deficit. 
This is given full view in an editorial on May 11, which describes the president’s efforts 
to reduce the national debt by accepting tax hikes as an inevitable by-product of a 
balanced budget agreement (“Those Budget Talks”). However, the most political 
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inconvenient editorial arguably arrives a couple of weeks later after Bush publicly signals 
his uneasy support for a tax increase (“Yes to Taxes”). This column discusses the 
disparity in Bush’s campaign promise of no new taxes with his presidential support for an 
increase in 1990. Correspondingly, one column which seems to justify the claim that The 
Washington Post treats Bush’s reversal more forgivingly is published on July 19, which 
blasts House Republicans for failing to fall in line with Bush’s support for a tax increase 
to begin addressing the fiscal health of the country (“The No-Fingerprints Party”). The 
column refers to House conservatives as “irresponsible” (“The No-Fingerprints Party”).  
A November 12 editorial by The Washington Post takes a position diametrically 
opposed to that of The Wall Street Journal (“Not Capital Gains Again”). In this column, 
the paper critiques the president for continual effort to cut the capital gains tax (“Not 
Capital Gains Again”). From this point forward, The Washington Post begins examining 
specific policy proposals of the budget negotiations as more information is released. 
However, these editorials are often obscured with political speculations as the ’92 
presidential race gets underway, which is not necessarily relevant to the scope of this 
work. In total, however, the elite reaction of The Washington Post’s editorial pieces on 
President Bush’s “read my lips” controversy is an extension of its fundamentally different 
political and moral perspective on the fiscal debate during this time.  
THE NEW YORK TIMES  
 
For the purposes of this project, The New York Times serves as a benchmark to 
measure the elite opinion of a major left-leaning news source. After reviewing editorial 
pieces from before and after President Bush broke his campaign pledge, it is clear that 
while The New York Times was not incredibly swayed by Bush’s lie itself, the paper’s 
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general editorial position appears to be shaped by the eventual policy decision of raising 
taxes. In a similar vein, the paper’s editorial team conveys that one of its primary 
concerns are the effects that policy inaction will have on the deficit and entitlement 
programs.  
From January 1990 to January 1991, hundreds of editorials appear in The New 
York Times featuring President Bush’s campaign promise of not raising taxes. As it is 
impossible to adequately describe all of these editorials, a sample has been selected to 
convey The New York Times editorial positions over the relevant period of time outlined 
above. The first editorial on the matter appears on January 28, 1990, which outlines 
Bush’s budget plan in broad strokes. Noting that Bush is intending on submitting this 
plan to the Congress in his first joint address, the editorial discusses the impact of Bush’s 
budget blueprint on Social Security with references as to how he can keep his promise of 
no new taxes, preserve Social Security entitlement spending, and deal with the deficit 
(“To Save Social Security, Save”). The New York Times follows up two days later with a 
much more critical editorial. This editorial examines the impact of the president’s fiscal 
plan in the context of attempting to keep his promise at the expense of good governance. 
Titled “His 'Integrity Fund': Arbitrary, Unfair,” the Times labels his plan a “noble-
sounding proposal,” but, in reality, gutting Social Security in the name of balancing the 
budget (“His 'Integrity Fund': Arbitrary, Unfair”). Similarly, a February 1 editorial 
criticizes the president for leveraging political promises to hallow out signature 
entitlement programs. The editorial slams the president for using the federal government 
as his own political “piggy bank” (“Mr. Bush's Piggy Bank”).  
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A March 13 editorial discusses the impact of House Ways and Means Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski’s insistence on attacking the federal deficit through a combination of 
new revenue measures and spending cuts (“Fighting the deficit too bravely”). This article 
is interesting because while Rep. Rostenkowski and President Bush struck an agreement 
not to address taxes in the first year of his presidency (Meacham 2015), the public signal 
by the chairman of the powerful House committee suggests that lawmakers were already 
maneuvering to put tax increase measures on the table as part of a negotiated settlement 
ahead of the president’s policy reversal in the ensuing months (“Fighting the deficit too 
bravely”). The next relevant piece appears on March 18, directly challenging the notion 
of reducing the deficit by eliminating entitlement and other spending programs that 
disproportionately benefit the nation’s poor. The piece reports that while the president 
wants to improve education and reduce drug abuse, his fiscal priorities outlined in his 
1991 budget amount to half of spending for fiscal year 1981, adjusted for inflation (“Yes: 
Drive Down the Deficit No: Don't Punish the Poor”). The editorial goes on to explain that 
while the president’s rhetoric is often in keeping with his vision for a kinder, gentler 
nation, policy plans appear completely devoted to reducing spending programs for low-
income households (“Yes: Drive Down the Deficit No: Don't Punish the Poor”).  
The first shift in editorial attention with respect to suspicion that President Bush 
might break his 1988 campaign pledge occurs on May 9, 1990. The editorial, titled “Yes, 
Cut the Deficit. Then What?” analyzes Bush’s willingness to discuss tax increase 
measures as part of a budget package (“Yes, Cut the Deficit. Then What?”). This is the 
first piece in which The New York Times covers President Bush’s budget plans in a 
favorable light as it relates to the deficit problem. Urged by Bush’s recent steps, the 
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Times refers to his openness as “encouraging” (“Yes, Cut the Deficit. Then What?”). 
Three weeks later, the Times follows up with an editorial presenting polling information 
that confirms voter awareness that taxes will likely increase (“New Taxes without Fear”). 
In addition, this editorial describes politicians as not wanting to admit that taxes are going 
up until after midterm elections despite widespread agreement that no alternative has 
been presented to assert control over the deficit (“New Taxes without Fear”). A month 
later, the Times runs an editorial announcing that the “momentous” decision by President 
Bush to grudgingly raise taxes has arrived (“The deficit, without pretense”). Interpreting 
the president’s decision as him disavowing the ‘88 pledge for the purpose of freeing 
congressional action, the Times frames the president’s decision as him getting “serious” 
with the budget negotiations and accepting tax increases as an inevitable dimension for a 
settlement (“The deficit, without pretense”).  
Roughly one month later, featuring the ominous headline, “Congress: One Month 
Left,” The New York Times points out that congressional inaction on advancing a deficit 
reducing budget is for the sole purpose of maintaining campaign contributions and 
dodging difficult votes ahead of the August recess (“Congress: One Month Left”). 
Congress, the paper directs, needs to get back to the nation’s business regardless of how 
politically uncomfortable it can be at times. On October 5, following tense budget 
negotiations between congressional leaders and the White House as well as a procedural 
House vote against the budget compromise a day earlier, the editorial warns that political 
challenges may ultimately overwhelm any constructive compromise on deficit reduction 
(“Rewriting the budget's wrongs”). The editorial challenges the durability of the fragile 
budget settlement (“Rewriting the budget's wrongs”). However, this caution is ultimately 
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proven wrong with the October 26 editorial praising the final outline of the negotiated 
budget settlement, which the paper notes is “credible and fair” in reducing the deficit 
over the next five years (“Warts and all, a budget victory”). In a similar vein, the editorial 
praises the president for his stewardship of the agreement through politically tense 
moments (“Warts and all, a budget victory”). Yet, this support proves temporary with an 
editorial two weeks later on November 9 describing a failing economy and “restlessness” 
within the Republican Party as political challenges he must overcome for future political 
victories (“The Halfway President”). For the purposes of this study, this is the last 
relevant editorial piece in the time period specified above.  In the final analysis, while 
The New York Times is never a champion of President Bush’s political or policy 
objectives, the paper grudgingly endorses the general framework of the policy decision 
which raised tax rates in the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. This is evidenced by 
editorial pieces before Bush’s reversal, which advocated for the increase as well as 
editorials after the president resolved his policy commitment with a tax hike.  
BUSH’S CREDIBILITY 
As stated earlier, a presidential lie can be defined as making a knowingly false 
statement with an explicit intention of deceiving or with previous information that 
contradicts expressed statements (Alterman 2005). However, a nuanced view of 
presidential credibility is critical in capturing the essence of presidential mistruths. In the 
case of George H.W. Bush, the promise not to raise taxes was borne out of a political 
necessity. Several have argued that in order to win the nomination and, subsequently, the 
general election, Bush had to consolidate conservative support (Meacham 2015). Yet, 
once Bush became president, the overwhelming responsibility to enact good policy gave 
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way to political promises made in the heat of a campaign (Meacham 2015). As slowing 
economic growth and congressional resistance to reach a settlement without revenue 
increases applied additional pressure to address the country’s fiscal challenges, the 
president was forced to violate his 1988 campaign promise. Yet, by doing exactly what 
Bush had said he would oppose, the president had shattered his credibility among 
conservatives (Dukakis Interview).  
Presidential credibility is at the heart of this important question involving political 
deception. If we are to agree that President Bush lied when he stated he would oppose 
any new tax increases despite information and insight he possessed which would have 
made such a promise politically irresponsible, how was his credibility effected? The way 
in which one defines credibility is important when examining George Bush’s pledge and 
his ultimate breach of it. Is credibility purely an exercise in maintaining pre-defined 
political promises even if it has the capacity to harm the nation? Or is political credibility 
the choice of re-envisioning policy priorities in light of new and emerging information? 
Neither description of credibility fully takes into account the multi-dimensional 
responsibilities an American president is faced with which complicates an already 
challenging decision-making process. 
In the case of “read my lips,” Bush made a political promise that economic 
realities prevented him from maintaining over the course of his term. Yet, insofar as Bush 
deceived the country, the policy flip was justified as a moral imperative not to continue 
on a course of economic self-harm and saddle future generations with enormous debt 
obligations. Several elite observers interviewed for this project acknowledge that Bush’s 
decision created discontent within the Republican Party which ultimately weakened Bush 
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politically (Dukakis 2017; Lott 2017; Stephanopoulos 2017). In the 1992 presidential 
primary, George Bush is challenged by Pat Buchanan. A conservative figure in the 
Republican Party dating back to the presidency of Richard Nixon, Buchanan relentlessly 
hits Bush for what he contends is the president breaking his promise (Richert 2012). To 
the extent that it hurt him in the 1992 presidential primary is important in understanding 
the level of discontent among conservatives within the party and, in turn, how Bush’s 
credibility was compromised in the eyes of Republican voters (Richert 2012). As Senator 
Lott recalls, “that was a beginning of a divide,” referring to the conservative insurgency 
on Bush’s right (Lott Interview). The primary challenge is a direct political consequence 
for what many consider an example of Bush’s insufficient conservatism.  
A key architect of Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign against Bush, George 
Stephanopoulos describes the damage to Bush’s political credibility as cumulative. “It 
hurt him in both the primary and general,” says the former Clinton aide-de-camp (author 
interview hereinafter referred to as “Stephanopoulos Interview”]). However, 
Stephanopoulos would not characterize Bush’s decision as a lie. “I wouldn’t call it a lie. 
It was an irresponsible promise, for sure. But I just don’t think it was a lie. Because it was 
in his control. He didn’t have to go along with it” (Stephanopoulos Interview). Having 
said that, Stephanopoulos contends that Bush’s credibility as a political leader was 
damaged. “It was certainly a credibility question. The most effective advertisement we 
ever aired against Bush were his words ‘read my lips’ with his face because at that point 
it was the most famous broken promise in the history of American politics” 
(Stephanopoulos Interview). Yet, Stephanopoulos argues that Bush made the right 
decision by raising taxes. “It was the right thing to do. It was a responsible decision” 
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(Stephanopoulos Interview). While it may have been the right decision to address the 
fiscal misfortune of the country, the political consequence for Bush was the emergence of 
a more conservative candidate.  
Stephanopoulos adds that “the economy was the biggest issue. We wanted the 
economy to be the heart of the campaign” (Stephanopoulos Interview). Stephanopoulos, 
who was one of the closest aides to Clinton during the campaign and would later become 
White House Communications Director in Clinton’s administration, also imagines Bush 
running a more effective campaign for re-election had he been more willing to discuss the 
benefits of the budget compromise in his race for re-election. “I think he could have 
owned up to it during the campaign and made a case that it was a good decision for the 
country” (Stephanopoulos Interview). This notion of greater transparency ties directly 
into questions of Bush’s credibility. As Stephanopoulos argues, the political 
consequences for Bush were only magnified by his refusal not to speak about it as a 
benefit for the country, as a whole (Stephanopoulos Interview).  
Richard M. Pious’ discussion on presidential legitimacy and the role that 
executive decisions have on the president’s ability to avoid common presidential failures 
are relevant in the case of President Bush (Pious 2008). Having been defeated 
approximately a year after commanding an international coalition to drive Iraq out of 
Kuwait, Bush went from having the highest domestic approval rating of an American 
president to an embattled incumbent fighting for his political life. Several prominent 
observers on this topic have argued that Bush had simply lost legitimacy as the steward 
of the economy in a time where the United States was in the throes of a deep recession 
(Dukakis 2017). The decision to raise taxes, even if it was good policy, antagonized a 
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financially vulnerable electorate that already felt the president was out of touch on 
economic issues. In the final analysis, Bush’s unwavering promise to oppose new taxes 
was a grave political miscalculation that made it impossible to avoid future failures which 
would ultimately surface with a responsible plan to address the deficit. During the late 
1980s and early ‘90s, the country needed an aggressive plan which reduced spending and 
increased revenues to even begin addressing the systemic problems of the U.S. deficit 
(Congress and the Nation). However, by framing budgetary concerns as a matter of 
character during the 1988 campaign and then violating a foundational pillar of his 
political message, Bush’s decision unraveled coalitional support among conservatives 
that was always conditional on the perception that Bush sustain core conservative goals. 
In this sense, the ultimate political consequence of “read my lips” was not so much a 
deception of the country at large as it was the political base which had supported Bush’s 
candidacy in 1988. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2011 Libyan Intervention  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 28, 2011, in a highly anticipated speech at the National Defense 
University, President Obama justified American military participation in the Libyan 
intervention. “Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the 
international community offered Gaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign... his forces 
continued their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 
men, women and children who sought their freedom from fear” (Obama 2011). The 
president continued, adding that “[i]t was not in our national interest to let that happen. I 
refused to let that happen.  And so, nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan 
leadership of Congress, I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1973” (Obama 2011).  While asserting that the world would 
be better without Gaddafi in power, the president balanced this claim by conceding that 
“broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake” (Obama 
2011). By ruling out an American military plan for regime change in Libya, the president 
was restricting the interpretation of the U.N. mandate to effectively include only the 
protection of civilian populations in Libya. Having said that, decisions made by U.S. 
officials and subsequent military actions taken by American and coalition forces provide 
evidence which suggests that regime change was a dimension of U.S. policy in the 
Libyan crisis. 
Despite the President’s nuanced language at the National Defense University 
relating to core U.S. objectives in Libya, Obama was not entirely forthcoming in 
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describing the American participation in the 2011 intervention. Presidents can never 
entirely level with the American people. As Richard Nixon said in his post-presidency 
years, there is an “importance and necessity of secrecy in the performance of the 
presidential role” (Wilson 2015, 59). As current scholarship demonstrates, presidential 
policies of a covert nature constitute a credibility problem if such policies attract 
sufficient public attention to the point that a president’s believability is doubted 
(Alterman 2005; Cannon 2008; Pfiffner 2008; Wilson 2015). In the case of President 
Obama’s 2011 military intervention in Libya, the president appeared to break with his 
long-standing commitment of extracting the United States from foreign conflicts. 
However, after eight weeks of political upheaval in the Middle East in March 2011, 
Obama was arguing for military action in Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians, 
but arguably falling into a plan of forcing regime change in Libya (Weissman 2016). As 
academics assert, a president’s credibility in military affairs is arguably the most 
consequential as it carries significant political and policy implications for the American 
people (Alterman 2005; Pfiffner 2008). While military action in Libya was seen by many 
in the American security community as necessary to preserve core U.S. national interests, 
the idea that the Obama administration viewed the NATO air campaign as a relatively 
inexpensive way of removing Muammar Gaddafi produces a credibility question as to the 
true aims of the Libyan intervention (Payandeh 2012). As reports indicate, President 
Obama’s willingness to intervene in the Libya crisis broke with a worldview which 
located a host of American foreign policy failures with a propensity for military 
intervention (Goldberg 2016; Tierney 2016). This chapter examines the Obama 
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administration policy towards Libya and to what extent U.S. participation in the 
intervention was motivated by a desire for regime change.  
When evaluating if the unstated objective in the 2011 Libyan crisis was regime 
change, several questions emerge which directly address the matter of presidential 
credibility in matters of foreign policy. First, did the stated American policy of protecting 
civilians evolve into a mission of forcing regime change? Did the Obama administration 
mislead the American public as it relates to its true motivations for U.S. involvement in 
the Libyan intervention? Was the administration truthfully conveying to the American 
people the military developments on the ground in Libya? Finally, what were the 
domestic political consequences for U.S. participation in the Libyan military 
intervention? Since the Libyan intervention occurred less than seven years ago and the 
post-Gaddafi political landscape is still developing, an historic perspective on the Libyan 
case is rather limited. In addition, sensitive and critical documents related to U.S. 
intelligence and military operations remain largely classified and out of range from public 
scrutiny. This chapter is largely supported by books on the intervention, news articles 
during and after the intervention, as well as interviews with U.S. military and intelligence 
personnel involved in the Libyan operation. 
ARAB SPRING BACKGROUND 
 
Beginning in late December 2010, protests calling for the ouster of authoritarian 
regimes were sweeping the Middle East and North Africa (Sadiki 2012). In Tunisia, 
scattered demonstrations formed in the streets in December 2010 had grown in size and 
intensity, ultimately creating the conditions for the long time Tunisian ruler, Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, to step down in January (Chivvis 2013). A few weeks later, in February 
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2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was similarly challenged by internal unrest. A 
longstanding ally strategically located along a major commercial shipping lane where a 
sizeable portion of western oil exports are transported, Egypt had been a regional military 
partner of the United States’ for decades (Chivvis 2013). Even though Mubarak had been 
an authoritarian ally for years, U.S. officials found it difficult to resist the democratic 
rhetoric of the protesters in Cairo rebelling against the long-time regime. By the middle 
of February 2011, Mubarak resigned (Landler 2016). In late February 2011, the 
international spotlight turned to Libya, which appeared to be on the brink of a civil war 
with a substantial anti-regime bloc forming against longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi.  
Over the course of January and February 2011, sustained protests in Cairo, Tunis, 
Amman, and other cities in the Middle East and North Africa appeared to signal some 
broader pan-Arab movement challenging established regimes (Chivvis 2013). The 
assumption of democratic language behind the protests tested the United States’ long-
time support for authoritarian governments historically sympathetic to U.S. interests in 
the region. As anti-establishment uprisings continued throughout the Middle East and 
allied regimes began breaking under pressure from continued upheaval, the United 
States’ position was further complicated by adversarial rulers in the region threatening a 
violent crackdown upon citizens rebelling against the repressive nature of their 
governments (Landler 2016). This was the case with Libya. Furthermore, allied countries 
such as France and Great Britain, sharing concerns of impending attacks on civilian 
populations within Libya by pro-government militias in late February 2011, pressed for 
more action in Libya on the part of western powers (Chivvis 2013; Landler 2016).  
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In the general climate of regime change, the Obama administration’s decision that 
the friendly government of Hosni Mubarak had to leave created an opening for removing 
openly hostile authoritarian regimes across the region. In Libya, tribal unrest and anti-
authoritarian sentiment revolting against Gaddafi’s regime was growing (Goldberg 2016). 
Rebel groups, referred to as thuwwar, had evolved from protecting their homes to 
organizing militia units to defend entire communities, primarily in the eastern cities of 
Misrata, Ajdabiya, and Benghazi (Chivvis 2013). As Vijay Prashad described it, 
“[w]orking-class protests in the industrial suburbs of Tripoli conjoined with political 
Islamist unrest in the eastern part of the country. These were rumbles from below. They 
were harnessed by human rights lawyers from Benghazi and by neoliberal ‘reformers’ 
who were able to set the pace of the Libyan revolt” (Prashad 6, 2012). These groups were 
numerous and splintered between pro-Islamist factions attracted to the Libyan opposition, 
regime-backed militias, and jihadist groups dedicated to spreading Islamic extremism as 
Libyan civil society deteriorated (BBC 2016). Yet, during a period in 2011 where global 
aspirations for a democratic political transformation in the Middle East and the Arab 
Maghreb seemed possible, foreign powers were further compelled to intervene.  
As a new wave of protests against the repressive Libyan regime provoked Gaddafi 
to threaten mass slaughter on the coastal city of Benghazi, the U.S. administration seized 
the fig leaf of protecting civilian populations (Chivvis 2013). As several scholars have 
argued, removing Gaddafi, an historic thorn in the side of U.S. policymakers, was shaped 
in large part by a desire for regime change. Gaddafi had been a hostile actor to American 
interests in the region. Examples included a state-sponsored attack in West Berlin in 1986 
which killed a U.S. serviceman as well as confrontations with U.S. naval assets over 
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territorial disputes in the Mediterranean (Landler 2016). In addition, the perception that 
the Libyan regime was already collapsing in early March 2011 further clarified that the 
United States had an interest in removing Gaddafi and participate in shaping the political 
dynamic during a post-regime period (Chivvis 2013).  In the context of the Arab spring, 
fragile democratic movements in Middle Eastern and North Africa were at stake if a 
brutal suppression of protests by the Gaddafi regime was allowed to take place 
(Dalacoura 2012). Likewise, a high number of civilian casualties in the eastern port cities 
of Libya by pro-regime militias were likely if rebel groups were not sufficiently 
supported with air and sea power (Morris 2013). Yet, evidence remains which suggests 
that U.S. and coalition forces took action beyond protecting civilian populations and, 
perhaps, fell into a regime change operation in Libya (Chivvis 2013).  
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION/NATO INVOLVEMENT 
 
The main international justification for a collective military response in Libya was 
borne out of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Resolution 
1970 authorized member-states to enforce an arms embargo to prevent weapons and 
artillery from entering Libya.12 Resolution 1973 established a no-fly zone over Libya. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 was used as the broad legal justification for the 
introduction of NATO forces into Libya for the purpose of enforcing the no-fly zone.13 
The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 condemned attacks by 
Gaddafi’s government on protesters and referred the government to the International 
                                                 
12
 “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1970 (March 17, 2011). Concerning Libya.” Resolution 1970. 
United Nations Security Council. United Nations. [Hereinafter referred to as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970.]  
13
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (March 17, 2011). Concerning Libya.” Resolution 1970. 
United Nations Security Council. United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. [Hereinafter referred to as United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.] 
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Criminal Court (the first time a country was ever referred to the ICC).14 Additionally, 
Resolution 1970 imposed a travel ban and froze assets linked to Gaddafi and other key 
regime actors.15 Three weeks later, on March 17, 2011, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1973 was adopted and supported by ten permanent and non-permanent 
countries of the U.N. Security Council. Support from permanent members included 
France, Great Britain, and the United States as well as non-permanent member support 
from Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa. Moreover, while Germany’s 
abstention produced frustration among western countries, the official abstention of China 
and Russia was perceived as a signal to move forward with NATO under the auspices of 
the U.N. framework (Ferdinand 2013). Resolution 1973 authorized the international 
community to establish and enforce a no-fly zone and to use “all means necessary” to 
protect civilian populations in Libya. The measure reinforced an existing arms embargo 
in Libya.16 Taken together, these resolutions offered the necessary political and 
international basis for a military intervention, which would ultimately come in the form 
of a U.S.-led strike on Libyan defense systems (Operation Odyssey Dawn) and a 
subsequent NATO enforced no-fly zone (Operation Unified Protector).17  
An assessment of the degree to which President Obama’s credibility was damaged 
in the Libyan crisis can be judged by how the United States enforced international 
mandates it helped create. Resolutions 1970 and 1973 provided the broad legal 
justifications for an international military and nonmilitary response to the Libyan crisis, 
respectively. However, evidence remains which demonstrates that, at times, coalition 
                                                 
14
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. 
15
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. 
16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. 
17  November 9, 2015. “NATO and Libya (Archived).” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website. Operation Unified Protector. 
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forces actively disregarded provisions within Resolution 1970 to the benefit of rebel and 
opposition groups in Libya (Chivvis 2013; Landler 2016; Payandeh 2012; Zenko 2016). 
In theory, UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 suggested that the international community 
remained a neutral actor in the Libyan conflict with the main focus directed towards 
protecting civilians. The intent behind the arms embargo was to de-escalate conflict 
within Libya in order to better protect civilian populations. However, as reports indicate, 
Egypt and Qatar were shipping offensive weapons to Libyan rebels (Zenko 2016). This 
was in coordination with U.S. military and intelligences forces, who were providing 
logistical support as well as air cover for thuwwar forces (Chivvis 2013). Yet, Resolution 
1970 prohibited arms transfers to both rebel and pro-regime forces in the Libyan war.18 In 
fact, NATO officials claimed to be enforcing the arms embargo. Despite these guidelines, 
operational footage published by NATO records the HMCS Charlottetown, a Canadian 
frigate patrolling Libyan ports for possible arms shipments, allowing a rebel vessel to 
pass into NATO-patrolled zones of Libyan ports after discovering arms, munitions, and 
explosives, which were prohibited under Section 9 of UNSC Resolution 1970 (Chivvis 
2013; Pugliese 2012). This is to say that NATO was not only failing to enforce an arms 
embargo outlined by Resolution 1970, but actively disregarding it to the point of aiding 
rebel forces in the fight against Gaddafi’s regime. In light of these facts, it is difficult to 
suggest the United States, which ultimately performed the bulk of intelligence and 
logistical work in support of the NATO operation, was not aware of these weapon 
movements.  
                                                 
18 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. 
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The support of the United States in the NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone and 
the prosecution of the arms embargo, coupled with the United States’ unparalleled burden 
for the performance of battlefield intelligence and logistical support to the benefit of 
rebels, reveals a lack of neutrality on the part of the U.S. in the Libyan conflict. 
Arguably, actions taken by American and coalition forces during major operations in 
Libya demonstrates indirect support of thuwwar forces in their struggle to topple 
Gaddafi. As experts have asserted, the loose interpretation of the U.N. mandate in the 
form of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 failed to restrict the western coalition 
(primarily Great Britain, France, and the United States) from supporting the Libyan 
rebels (Chivvis 2013; Pugliese 2012 Zenko 2016). In this sense, it is difficult to imagine 
that the United States’ policy aim did not ultimately include regime change if it was 
providing weapons and munitions to opposition groups. The fact that Resolution 1970 
was voted out of the Security Council with the support of the parties involved in the 
HMCS Charlottetown incident creates the impression that the U.N. mandate was more 
about blunting concerns among reluctant BRIC19 countries of an expansive military 
operation while a genuine case of mission creep set in under the humanitarian banner of 
the United Nations.  
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION DEBATE 
 
Presidential credibility can be judged by the reality of how decisions are made 
and the political context in which they are perceived by the public. In this sense, a 
challenge for Obama was the fact that different parts of the government were advocating 
for different strategies in Libya (Kamola 2018; Landler 2016). As some experts assert, 
                                                 
19 Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC).  
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contemporary political debates frame Libya as an “intra-administration” struggle between 
interventionists and foreign policy advisors reluctant to fight a third Middle Eastern war 
in less than ten years.  
The pro-interventionist wing included NSC aide Samantha Power, U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, and to a lesser extent Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton. Administration officials who were reluctant to enter the fight included 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and foreign 
policy hand Denis McDonough. These two camps were advising President Obama in his 
difficult decision over Libya. For the liberal interventionists, they presented Rwanda as 
the counterfactual for justifying an intervening in Libya (Kamola 2018). As Isaac Kamola 
describes, “[d]uring 2013, the legacy of the genocide in Rwanda was similarly a refrain in 
conversations about intervention in the Libyan civil war” (Kamola 76, 2018). The 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, which the Clinton administration stubbornly refused to enter, 
resulted in the death of over 500,000 people in only a few months. Samantha Power, who 
wrote A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
work on the Rwandan genocide, believed inaction in Libya could produce a similar result 
if the west refused to act as it had in 1994. In the aftermath of Rwanda, Susan Rice, who 
directed the African Bureau of the National Security Council at the time of the 1994 
genocide, later claimed she would do everything in her power prevent another mass 
slaughter of civilians as witnessed in Rwanda (Chivvis 2013). For the anti-
interventionists in the White House, a concern that the U.S. military was presently 
overextended, coupled an already obscure objective in Libya, produced resistance to any 
military plan in the Pentagon (Landler; Chivvis 2013; Gates 2014).   
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Other scholars and experts argue that the concern to preserve western economic 
interests in the region was the driving force for an intervention in Libya (Landler 2016; 
Prashad 2012; Zenko 2016). A key U.S. intelligence aide with access to these 
discussions, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about internal deliberations over 
Libya, highlighted the economic considerations under examination by the administration. 
“Remember, Libya is a member of OPEC [Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries]. There was credible evidence coming into us at the [Department of Defense] 
that suggested Gaddafi was going to become more erratic and unpredictable” with Libyan 
oil exports and the impact on the global energy market (Author Interview 2018). Indeed, 
the Brent crude mark, a barometer which serves as a price reference in the oil market, had 
increased roughly fifteen dollars per barrel from the time the Libyan crisis began until the 
U.S. intervention commenced on March 19, 2011. 
As the prospects of a civil war engulfing Libya became more realistic, the impact 
of dramatically reduced crude production was challenging global energy markets, which 
were already under pressure by reduced exports.20 Pressed if U.S. officials were 
concerned that Gaddafi would sabotage oil fields and refineries as a pre-emptive measure 
designed to evade a U.S. response to the chaos in Libya, the intelligence analyst 
responded that while he could not confirm these sensitive details, the sentiment of the 
question was fair (Author Interview 2018). The analyst continued, adding that “the 
United States has clear security interests in the region. As the Arab world was being 
rocked with the instability of the protests, we could not afford to have Gaddafi leveraging 
the global energy security of the world” (Author Interview 2018). On the other hand, the 
                                                 
20  “Country Analysis Brief: Libya.” U.S. Energy Information Administration 2018.  
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source spoke of security concerns inside Libya, which put U.S. personnel at risk. “There 
were incidents, not reported in the media, where pro-regime forces engaged U.S. assets 
on the ground. I wouldn’t say it was the motivator for our response, but we had a concern 
and presented it in our assessment” (Author Interview 2018).  
COVERT POLICIES & PRESIDENTIAL CREDIBILITY 
 
The standard of judgment as to whether President Obama’s Libya policy was 
damaging to his credibility requires the determination if full disclosure is necessary on 
sensitive military matters. Several academics have argued that there are several ways in 
which presidents can avoid telling the public the truth (Cannon 2007; Pfiffner 2008; 
Thompson 2010; Wilson 2015). Pfiffner’s argument suggests a distinction between 
covert actions and covert policies. Covert actions are often secret in order to protect 
individuals, which are intended to support legitimate foreign policy goals justified under 
the U.S. Constitution (Pfiffner 2008). However, covert policies include examples where 
the president says the government is forwarding policy X when in reality it is pursuing 
policy Y (Pfiffner 2008). Libya did not require a significant American investment of 
troops or resources (Goldberg 2016). Nevertheless, it was an intervention supported in 
large part by the United States and which put a number of American service members in 
an active conflict zone (Chivvis 2013; Landler 2016; Goldberg 2016; Zenko 2016). 
Ultimately, if the main reason behind the administration’s decision to intervene in Libya 
was regime change, which it did not disclose to the American public, then such action 
would constitute a covert policy.  
President Obama entered office as someone critical of foreign adventurism. Yet, 
as the Arab Spring emerged as potentially destabilizing to American security interests, 
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the administration found itself slipping into an interventionist role that it had previously 
regarded as irresponsible and reckless. In the flux of events, President Obama followed a 
policy course that he had previously opposed in Iraq. The perception that Obama was 
pursuing a policy in Libya inconsistent with his previous rhetoric situates Libya as 
perhaps an example where the president was dragged into a conflict by advisers and 
foreign allies. For Obama, the challenge in its approach was how to put together and 
maintain complex partnerships among nations that had few shared objectives (Chivvis 
2013; Landler 2016). For the most part, the European aim was to get the United States to 
perform a great deal of the logistical and intelligence work associated with a technically 
complex military mission. As experts have noted, the French ambition for a role in the 
Libyan intervention was also about reasserting its national military prestige on the global 
stage (Chivvis 2013; Author Interview 2018). In the case of Great Britain, foreign policy 
analysts have suggested that David Cameron saw Libya as an opportunity to shore up his 
domestic political base with a humanitarian operation borne out of a traditional 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) appeal in which Great Britain would play an outsized 
role.  
Contemporary academic discussions have asserted that the most significant 
foreign policy decision a president can make is going to war. Yet, under false or 
misleading information, a president compromises the ability of the public to make an 
informed decision on a fundamental policy concern. This directly impacts a president’s 
credibility. Fisher argues that presidential misrepresentations of policy seems almost 
routine in justifying American entrance and prolonged engagement in foreign conflicts 
(Fisher 2010). However, Fisher also finds that misleading the American public about the 
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reason for entering a military operation can result a president’s credibility being 
hampered. The thrust of this argument builds on Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal book, The 
Imperial Presidency, which documents particular abuses of executive power as it relates 
to inserting U.S. Armed Forces in foreign conflicts (Schlesinger 1973). Asserting that the 
contemporary presidency is not limited by constitutional boundaries in war-making, the 
nature of presidential lying has been blurred by the excesses in justifying American 
foreign policy adventures with executive powers (Schlesinger 1973). While few 
academic works have argued that President Obama explicitly lied over the reason for 
intervening in Libya, the main thrust of criticism locates the inability of the U.S. 
administration to adequately explain that there political and military strategy forced 
regime change.  
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
A great deal of academic and non-academic scholarship on the 2011 Libyan 
intervention focuses on the role that European powers played in the military operation 
which ultimately removed Gaddafi. As several foreign policy scholars maintain, a central 
reason the U.S. decided to participate in the intervention was the persuasion campaign by 
Great Britain and France for more direct U.S. involvement. Yet, it is worth understanding 
the relationship that Libya shared with major European governments preceding the Arab 
Spring. According to a high-level European diplomat interviewed for this project, who 
requested anonymity to speak candidly about the European perspective of events during 
the Arab Spring, Libya was practically an ally of the French government before 2011. 
“After 9/11, Gaddafi had become closer to the west. He had cleverly given up his 
ambition to possess nuclear weapons. Historically, Gaddafi’s government had been a 
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secular regime. It rejected Islamic fundamentalism in the 2000s. And so, it was quite 
trendy for western governments to become closer to Libya because it was perceived as a 
source of stability” (Author Interview 2018). Prashad shares this opinion, writing that 
“Gaddafi had given his regime over to the Atlantic states as an ally in the War on Terror 
and as a provider of oil” (Prashad 7, 2012). Pressed to explain why the French 
government felt so strongly to get involved in Libya when it had shunned any sort of 
action in Iraq, which also carried with it designs for ousting an authoritarian government, 
the European diplomat stated the existence of an official and non-official version of 
events. “Officially, when events in Libya started, Sarkozy thought there could be a risk of 
genocide. Gaddafi’s statement that he was going to go house by house killing rebels and 
their families like rats inspired Sarkozy to get involved. This was the official public 
position adopted by the French government.”  
According to this diplomat, who possesses a sophisticated technical understanding 
of Middle Eastern politics, the non-official reason for France entering the Libyan crisis is 
deeply connected with French political and commercial interests in Libya and the region, 
as a whole. “What was not publicly disclosed is that when the Arab Spring started, the 
French government was seen to be on the side of the conservative authoritarians in the 
Middle East, especially in Tunisia with [President] Ben Ali. There was no forceful 
repudiation of these repressive regimes by France up until Libya became such a hot 
button topic. This is how it was perceived in Europe” (Author Interview 2018). The 
European source added that “as Libya came to be seen as a possible humanitarian 
catastrophe, France re-positioned itself on the side of the people’s revolt against Gaddafi. 
It was pretty clever” (Author Interview 2018). These assertions are supported both by 
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official government parliamentary and exhaustive news reports, which challenge Franco-
British military action in Libya (Wintour and Elgot 2016). As Michael Elliot wrote in 
2011, “Sarkozy started off on the wrong side of the Arab Spring, his government staying 
cozily entwined with that of Tunisia when the street had turned against it” (Elliot 2011). 
In March 2018, former President Sarkozy was placed under a formal investigation as to 
whether he illegally received millions of euros in campaign funding from Gaddafi and the 
late dictator’s regime (Chrisafis 2018).  
As for the commercial interests, the source claims France was actively cultivating 
a relationship with Gaddafi to gain access to oil reserves and exploration rights (Lusher 
2011; Murphy and Gehmlich 2007). “Before 2011, France was trying to get closer to 
Libya. Sarkozy was in competition with Italy and Britain for access to the vast oil 
reserves in the country” (Author interview 2018). Yet, for France, this could have 
actually been a reason to oppose Gaddafi as the situation in Libya deteriorated and the 
longtime ruler’s domestic authority waned. “Italy had signed an [oil exploration] 
agreement with Libya. They had signed joint-exploration agreements for new oil reserves 
in Libya. Some European diplomats believe France was interested in taking out Gaddafi 
to compete with the [Italian Prime Minister] Berlusconi for these rich contracts. Thinking 
that Gaddafi’s days were numbered, Sarkozy saw that his support for an opposition 
regime could give France entree with new contracts who enjoyed French support in 
taking out Gaddafi” (Author Interview 2018). Nevertheless, as a British MP wrote in a 
committee report criticizing the response, Britain and France appeared to have “elided 
into regime change and then we had no proper appreciation of what was going to happen 
 
 
58 
in the event of regime change, no proper understanding of Libya, and no proper plan for 
the consequences” (Winter and Elgot 2016). 
 
The European source also suggested the activist work of French intellectual 
Bernard Henri-Levy and his support for a strong western response had a real impression 
on Sarkozy. “Then Levy got involved. Levy was this sort of philosopher who was loosely 
involved with what was going on in Libya and had powerful connections in the French 
government. He’s more right wing in terms of his views on Middle East power politics, 
particularly Israel. But his campaign of persuasion convinced Sarkozy to act on 
humanitarian grounds” (Author Interview 2018). In his New Yorker piece on the topic, 
Richard Brody acknowledges the impact that Levy had in shaping Sarkozy’s thoughts 
and decision-making on Libya. “[T]he politicization of intellectuals—and the converse, 
the intellectualization of politics—has been a key feature of French life at least since the 
eighteenth century” (Brody 2011). Brody adds that “[i]n the run-up to France’s military 
engagement against Gaddafi's regime in Libya...Lévy—who began his career, in the 
seventies, as a political philosopher and has been an extraordinarily prominent media 
figure—played a vigorous role in rallying the French government, and perhaps even our 
own, to the cause of military intervention on behalf of the Libyan uprising” (Brody 
2011). The diplomat suggested this advocacy was in the vein of trying to avoid another 
massive human catastrophe while the west remained paralyzed on the sidelines. “The 
theory was that the West could not stand by and watch another Rwanda unfold” (Author 
Interview 2018). 
In terms of western European countries attempting to convince the United States 
to enter the effort in Libya, several claim this was not the case initially. According to the 
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European official, who spoke regularly with French government insiders intimately 
involved in the Libya matter, France “always understood that Obama was committed to 
distancing himself from the neo-conservative policies of the past decade. And, for the 
most part, Europe embraced his reluctance” (Author Interview 2018). This also served 
French and British interests whose governments were seeking to reassert their military 
prowess on the world stage (Watt and Norton-Taylor 2011; Wintour and Elgot 2016). 
“France and Great Britain wanted to demonstrate that they could intervene without the 
support of America. But this was preposterous” (author interview). According to 
published reports in 2011, perhaps delusions of grandeur played a role in European 
powers’ desire to intervene. “There will be those who argue that France and Britain are 
behaving the way they are simply because they think their history entitles them to, 
because they want to show that they are still great powers” (Elliot 2011). Interviewed for 
this work, the European source recalls that Great Britain and France came to understand 
that a complicated military intervention like Libya required access to the regionally 
convenient NATO bases in Sicily, which would require direct military participation by 
the United States. “The French bases in Corsica were too far away. So, NATO bases in 
Sicily had to be used. And therefore, if it was a NATO operation, the U.S. had to enter 
the fight on military and political ground to make it politically palatable for other western 
countries” (Author Interview 2018).  
Similarly, battlefield statistics and the level of individual country participation in 
the 2011 Libyan intervention supports these claims (Chivvis 2013). For example, “Nine 
days into the [Odyssey Dawn] operation, the United States had fired 192 Tomahawks, 
with Britain firing only 7. The United States dropped 455 precision-guided munitions, 
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with 147 from the coalition. The United States also played an essential role in other key 
areas, flying 80 percent of all air refueling, almost 75 percent of aerial surveillance, and 
100 percent of the electronic warfare missions” (Chivvis 89, 2013). These numbers 
broadly demonstrate that the United States ultimately performed most of the targeting, 
logistical, and battlefield work in Libya (Chivvis 2013).  
MEASURING U.S. DOMESTIC OPINION  
 
It should be noted that public opinion polling on the U.S. intervention in Libya 
could not measure domestic opinion as it relates to broader questions of presidential 
credibility. This is because the conditions in Libya and the decisions which would 
ultimately produce public scrutiny over the U.S. administration’s actions were only 
subsequently revealed. While presidential credibility means believability on the part of 
American voters, the believability of the electorate in the foreign policy realm can only 
be adequately assessed if the public knows what actually occurred. Therefore, an 
historical analysis of academic and expert analysis is much more relevant than a review 
of public survey polls.  
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 A review of U.S. public opinion polling reveals that most Americans were 
divided over the American intervention in Libya (Gallup 2011; Pew Research Center 
2011). A Pew Research Center study captured the divided nature of U.S. domestic public 
opinion as it relates to the use of force in Libya. The survey, which was conducted 
between March 10-13, sampled 1,000 adults. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the American 
public overwhelmingly held the opinion that the United States did not have a 
responsibility to do something about the fighting between regime forces and anti-
government groups in Libya. Specifically, sixty-three percent of respondents answered 
that the United States had no responsibility to act in Libya. Only twenty-seven percent 
suggested the U.S. had a responsibility to intervene.21 In a similar vein, polling data 
revealed that Americans decisively opposed a U.S. bombing campaign against the Libyan 
military and its air defenses. As Figure 2 reveals, only forty-four percent favored the 
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United States enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya. Forty-five percent opposed the idea. 
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this survey was the fact that sixty-nine percent of 
Americans opposed the idea of providing arms and weaponry to anti-government 
groups.22  
 
While the United Nations explicitly ruled out the idea of transporting arms in the 
Libya conflict in Security Council Resolution 1970, this provision would ultimately be 
violated by Egypt, Qatar, Canada, and the United States, as evidenced by the Canadian 
frigate incident captured in NATO footage of port patrols (Chivvis 2013). An analysis of 
the Pew Research Center data indicates that a substantial portion of the U.S. population 
recognized that America’s armed forces were already burdened by over commitments. 
Furthermore, the fact that only fifty-percent of voters answered that the United States had 
                                                 
22 Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya. Pew Research Center. March 14, 2011. 
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a clear goal suggested a deeper ambivalence on the part of Americans with the public 
rationale for the Libyan mission.23 
Another Pew Research Poll released a few days later underlined the fact that most 
Americans saw the U.S. mission in Libya as unclear. Despite the fact that President 
Obama’s National Defense University Speech fell within the polling time frame of this 
survey, an increasing percentage of Americans responded that U.S. military action lacked 
a coherent objective. Fifty-seven percent of respondents said the military mission lacked 
a clear goal, which marked a seven-percent increase from a week earlier. In a similar 
vein, only fifty-percent of respondents said the United States and its allies made the right 
decision by intervening two weeks earlier, compared to thirty-seven saying it was the 
wrong decision. This revelation may be better explained by previous data demonstrating 
that Americans felt U.S. armed forces were already overcommitted in the Middle East. 
Virtually unchanged was the fact that sixty-six percent of respondents opposed the United 
States sending arms and military supplies to the rebel groups, compared to only twenty-
five percent.  
The Gallup polling as it relates to American views on the U.S. intervention were 
slightly different from that of the Pew Research survey data. In particular, the data 
illustrates that Americans were much more likely to support the intervention in the 
beginning and that support was not situated along party lines.24 However, over time, 
support among Republicans declines while Democratic support remains relatively 
consistent. The two Gallup polls on the issue, which were conducted on March 21, 2011 
                                                 
23 April 5, 2011. “Goal of Libyan Operation Less Clear to Public: Top Middle East Priority: Preventing Terrorism.” U.S. Politics & 
Policy. Pew Research Center. 
24 Jones, Jeffrey M. (March 22, 2011). “Americans Approve of Military Action Against Libya, 47% to 37%.” Gallup.  
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and June 22, 2011, respectively, each randomly sampled 999 adults aged eighteen and 
over throughout all fifty U.S. states.25 The first Gallup poll, which was performed days 
after the U.S. publicly signed on to the NATO operation and took similar action to 
enforce the United Nations no-fly zone, showed that forty-seven percent of Americans 
approved of the action against Libya. A breakdown of the results by political party 
demonstrates a balanced distribution of approval and disapproval across the political 
spectrum. As Figure 3 illustrates, Fifty-seven percent of Republicans approved of the 
president’s decision, while thirty-one percent disapproved. For Democrats, fifty-one 
percent approved, and thirty-four percent disapproved. Even if one does not accept the 
notion that Republicans are historically more hawkish when it comes to the use of 
military force, polling clearly shows that Republican have supported U.S. military 
interventions at substantially higher rates than Democrats in the last decade.26 This may 
help explain why Republican respondents initially registered higher levels of support for 
President Obama’s actions in Libya when compared to Democrats.  
                                                 
25
 American Opinion of Military Action in Libya. Gallup. March 22, 2011.  
26 “War Through Partisan Lenses.” Gallup. November 15, 2005.  
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As a group, Independents most vocally registered their disapproval for U.S. action 
in Libya with forty-four percent disapproving and only thirty-eight percent approving. 
Initial analysis by Gallup suggested that Republicans had a higher rate of approval 
because Republicans generally support military action more frequently than Democrats. 
As the Gallup survey noted, however, Democratic support was higher due to subsequent 
surveys registering disproportionally higher support among Democratic voters for the 
president’s agenda in total than Republicans. Interestingly, as evidenced by the initial 
Gallup survey in March 2011, while the stated objective of the military operation was to 
protect civilians in Libya from regime attacks, eighty-five percent of respondents who 
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approved of the U.S. mission also supported U.S. action that would ultimately end with 
Gaddafi’s removal.27  
A second poll conducted by Gallup in June 2011 suggested Republican support 
for the intervention had dropped substantially to only thirty-nine percent. This totaled an 
eighteen-percent decline in Republican approval for the U.S. intervention over the span 
of three months when the U.S. intervention first took place. This data is reproduced in 
Figure 4 above. Forty-seven percent of Republicans opposed the intervention.28 The same 
survey showed that Democratic support had increased from fifty-one percent to fifty-four 
percent. Democratic disapproval only increased one-percentage point to thirty-five 
percent. Independent support declined to thirty-one percent. This totaled a seven-percent 
drop in approval by Independent voters. A clear majority of fifty-two percent of 
                                                 
27 American Opinion of Military Action in Libya. Gallup. March 22, 2011.  
28 American Opinion of Military Action in Libya. Gallup. June 24, 2011. 
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Independents opposed U.S. military action in Libya, which exposed an eight-percent 
increase in the disapproval rating among Independents. Key takeaways from the two 
Gallup polls seem to be that while Republican support for the U.S. intervention initially 
moved higher than that of self-identifying Democrats, sustained political support is 
located among members of the president’s party. Secondly, and perhaps the clearest 
indication of American apathy for foreign interventionism, is that Independents constitute 
the largest opposition group to military support in Libya. This polled segment of the 
domestic population disapproved of the U.S. intervention in a decisive majority.  
While this chapter addresses the question of presidential credibility relating to 
U.S. participation in the 2011 Libyan intervention, it also seemed appropriate to include 
polling data of public attitude towards the intervention in the five participating countries. 
A Financial Times/Harris poll also revealed that the five main participating countries in 
the NATO operation in Libya lacked majority domestic support for operations in Libya. 
The poll, which polled 6,241 adults among the five participating countries between 
March 30 and April 4, provided evidence of a relatively broad western resistance towards 
military intervention. For example, in Italy, forty-nine percent of respondents opposed 
military action, compared to twenty-nine percent who opposed such action. France 
registered the highest percentage of respondents who supported the NATO military 
action with forty-percent approving and thirty-one percent disapproving. Great Britain 
also expressed a clear division in public attitude with thirty-seven in favor and thirty-six 
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percent against military action. For Spain, a narrow plurality of voters was in favor of 
military action.29  
ELITE PUBLIC OPINION 
An interesting dimension to the Libyan case is the fact that a substantial portion of 
media coverage demonstrated support for an American role in the 2011 military 
intervention. Throughout the entire month of March 2011, twelve editorial pieces 
appeared in The New York Times endorsing a strong position against Gaddafi’s regime. 
For example, on March 9, an editorial titled, “Washington’s Options on Libya” appeared 
which criticized President Obama’s conflicted messaging of American policy in Libya in 
light of the deteriorating situation in the North African country. In the editorial, the Times 
suggested that a lack of resolve on the part of the president in terms of matching his 
rhetoric of supporting democratic change with military action was weakening American 
credibility at a pivotal moment in the Middle East.30 In the editorial, the paper makes 
clear that the only contribution the United States can make is stopping the impending 
assault on Libyan civilians. In this vein, the Times suggests that rhetorical posturing in 
Washington stop and that the administration support a military campaign against Gaddafi.  
Moreover, the Times’ judgement that American credibility is weakened because 
of a failure to respond swiftly with military action underscores the reality that the paper 
was a major advocate for regime change in Libya. That editorial was followed by a piece 
on March 22, 2011, which refers to Gaddafi as a “thug” and “murderer” who has never 
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30 “Washington’s Options on Libya.” The New York Times. Editorial. The New York Times Company. New York, New York. March 
9, 2011. 
 
 
 
69 
been held to account for his crimes. The editorial, with the caption “At War in Libya,” 
references United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and makes clear it hopes 
“all necessary means” are used by member nations to bring him to justice.31 This bold use 
of language on the part of The New York Times is consistent with its general preference 
for military action in the run-up to the intervention.  
Two days later, The Times runs another editorial, criticizing the United States for 
allowing France to become the leading western voice for military action in Libya. The 
piece critiques the administration for its inability to reassert leadership over France in 
Libya, especially in light of France’s recent opposition to American military action in 
Iraq. However, the editorial also praises French President Nicolas Sarkozy for his 
relentless advocacy for a United Nations-endorsed no-flight zone. The editorial claims 
that Sarkozy’s actions probably prevented the total destruction of Benghazi. An 
interesting dimension of The New York Times coverage of the Obama administration’s 
policy towards Libya as it relates to military action is its heavy criticism for failing to 
implement a military policy sooner.32 This is evident in a March 29 editorial, which 
comes after President Obama’s policy speech at the National Defense University. In the 
editorial, titled “President Obama on Libya: Nine days after the air campaign begins, the 
president presents his case,” the Times approves of Obama’s decision to join allies in the 
Libyan intervention, but asserts that the president was too slow to move militarily and has 
yet to convey a clear long-term strategy of the U.S. mission in Libya.33 What appears 
interesting in the Times’ assessment is their criticism of the president for his failure to 
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commit sooner militarily, but also the editorial audacity of challenging the administration 
for its inability to clarify the broader U.S. military strategy in Libya.  
The New York Times’ persistence for increased military action is again on display 
in an April 8, 2011 editorial labeled “Keeping Ahead of Gaddafi: NATO should run the 
show, but some American warplanes are still needed in the fight.” In the editorial, the 
paper pushes the administration to commit more warplanes to the NATO operation in 
Libya to finally break Gaddafi’s forces.34 This editorial is complemented by another 
piece a week later. In the April 15 editorial, the Times again calls for a more aggressive 
military posture against Gaddafi and his forces, arguing that the coalition must deepen its 
commitment to rebels and stop blaming each other for the disappointing “state of affairs” 
on the ground. The paper urges the United States and its NATO partners to dedicate 
themselves to a renewed sense of purpose in Libya by strengthening the military coalition 
inside Libya to topple Gaddafi.35  
Three weeks later, the Times arguably publishes its most pro-interventionist 
editorial relating to the American and NATO intervention in Libya. In the piece, dated 
May 6, 2011, the paper urges that as Gaddafi’s forces are disorganized and on the verge 
of defeat, NATO should commit substantial military means to “tip the balance” in favor 
of the Libyan rebels.36 These pieces seem to adopt the approach of liberal interventionists 
who identify the use of military force as a way of pressuring regime change. This 
sentiment is conveyed again in a May 18, 2011 editorial. Under the headline, “President 
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Obama and the Arab Spring: His speech on Thursday must articulate support for 
democratic change--and a peace deal,” the piece turns to the broader question of 
democratic change in the Arab world. To what extent, the editorial asks, can military 
action in Libya under the pretext of supporting an anti-authoritarian revolt be 
extrapolated to reflect the greater change occurring within the region.37 
 Contrastingly, The New York Times does not question the motives for military 
action in Libya but expresses frustration for how regime change can be replicated across 
the region through support of anti-authoritarian movements across the Arab world. A 
May 20, 2011 editorial similarly functions by way of promoting coercive democracy in 
the region. Under the caption, “Peace and Change: President Obama said many right 
things about the Arab Spring, but he can't stop there,” the paper praises President Obama 
for promising to support democratic movements in the Middle East. However, the report 
also criticizes Obama for not including a more comprehensive vision of the “promises 
and challenges” now underway in the Arab world.38 In this sense, The Times’ is further 
committing itself to the liberal interventionist vision that supports the removal of 
oppressive regimes through military force, but challenges the Obama administration to 
present a broader strategy for how this can be accomplished.  
The Washington Post’s coverage generally supported military intervention in 
Libya on humanitarian grounds. Much as The New York Times endorsed the broader ideal 
of ousting Gaddafi for the immediate protection of civilians and the historical menace the 
Libyan regime posed to western interests, the Post’s commentary locates similar 
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inconsistencies with President Obama’s strategic vision of military disengagement. A 
great deal of the editorial pieces from March to June 2011 celebrate the American and 
NATO military action taken against Gaddafi. However, the publication warns that 
Obama’s ambivalence towards using force to support democratic movements in the Arab 
world risks an unraveling of the western coalition.  
The Washington Post’s editorial campaign relating to the Libyan crisis begins on 
March 9, 2011 with a piece focused on the impact that reduced crude exports from Libya 
would have on the western economic recovery. Referencing the possibility of a global 
reduction in demand, coupled with the spiraling political situation in the Middle East in 
March 2011, the Post asserts that the proposed gas tax would be a short term gain for the 
U.S. Treasury in shoring up additional revenue and preventing the flow of additional 
funds to authoritarian regimes in light of emerging events in the Middle East.39 However, 
the substance of the editorial barely addresses the geopolitical consequences of the 
military intervention in Libya by U.S. and NATO forces. Then, on March 19, 2011, the 
Washington-based publication writes that the United States and the international 
community has a chance to defend democratic values in Libya. If, as The Washington 
Post warns, the western world fails to stand up for these values, the international 
community’s response would be “rendered hollow” with regard to any future actions 
taken in Libya. In a sense, the March 19th editorial is arguably the most aggressive in 
terms of pushing the international coalition to adopt the liberal interventionist approach 
of forcing democratic change in Libya.40At the same time, an underlying criticism in this 
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editorial is the notion that the Obama administration lacks an integrated organizing 
principle that coherently articulates the American policy in Libya.  
The editorial disapproval on March 19th is confirmed in a subsequent publication 
several days later with the unfavorable headline “Confused in Libya.” The editorial 
writes that “another abdication of leadership won't free Mr. Obama from Libya for long.” 
The piece describes a scenario where the western coalition fails to adequately support the 
rebel forces. In turn, this lack of armed support has the potential to produce a military 
stalemate between thuwaar forces and regime-backed militias, which ultimately leaves 
Gaddafi in power as part of a negotiated settlement. As the paper outlines, the risk in this 
approach is a greater humanitarian catastrophe. The solution, as the Post suggests, is a 
total commitment to the objective of removing Gaddafi. As this editorial demonstrates, a 
general theme among the major American publications is support for military action 
while, at the same time, challenging the administration as to how the Libyan issue fits 
into a broader policy of engagement with the Arab world. The criticism situates itself by 
questioning the Obama administration's genuine commitment to supporting anti-
authoritarian and democratic movements in the Arab world.   
 A substantial amount of evidence exists which supports the claim that major news 
publications were cheerleading for airstrikes in Libya. In fact, on March 29, 2011, during 
the same time President Obama gave his policy speech on Libya at the National Defense 
University, The Washington Post writes that the opening airstrikes in Libya were a 
definite success in the protection of the rebel-held city of Benghazi.41 Without any 
reference to Pentagon studies or interviews with rebel leaders on the ground, the Post 
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declares that without the initial strikes performed by allied forces, Gaddafi would have 
certainly destroyed the coastal city in Eastern Libya. While this may be true, the 
sentiment of these editorials creates the impression that The Washington Post and other 
media outlets were supportive of the military campaign in Libya for a variety of reasons 
that are neither consistent nor possessing an appropriate appreciation for the complicated 
political dynamics undergirding military engagement in the region. In keeping with its 
hawkish posture towards Libya, the paper criticizes the decision to transfer the primary 
responsibility for the Libyan campaign from the United States to NATO. In the April 6, 
2011 issue, the Post suggests that such a transition would minimize the impact of the 
American AC-130 and A-10 Warthog planes that had devastated regime military assets in 
their march towards Benghazi.42 Two weeks later, in a corresponding editorial, the paper 
decries what it deems a stalemate in Libya between NATO and the rebel groups they 
were supporting. As the paper contends, the absence of the American aircraft was the 
reason for this prolonged battle, which resulted in a greater number of casualties than 
required had the formal operations remained under the command of American forces.43 
The editorial cites an unnamed rebel who reports that the effectiveness of the NATO 
airstrikes degraded with the lack of American air cover and support, leading to a 
resurgence of pro-Gaddafi forces in Misurata. 
From late April to the end of May 2011, The Washington Post publishes several 
editorials which continue to question the broader strategy of the United States policy in 
Libya. In addition, this is one of the first times that any major publication begins detailing 
the internal friction within the administration over Libya and Middle East policy, in 
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general. On May 1, 2011, in an editorial titled “A strategy of slowness,” the paper recalls 
several of the administrations reactions towards pivotal events during the Arab Spring. 
The piece concludes that the administration has not only failed to develop a coherent 
policy addressing the emerging desire for democracy in the Arab world, but that 
President Obama has only supported protesters after it was evident that the authoritarian 
rulers had no sustainable path to maintain power in their respective countries.44 Roughly 
three weeks later, The Washington Post makes it known that it rejects the notion that 
American participation in the Libyan intervention requires congressional approval as the 
NATO operation is directed by a group of member countries, which happens to include 
the United States. On the same day, the Post runs an additional editorial claiming that at 
long last the administration has supplied coherence to a confused policy in Libya. 45This 
editorial is interesting in light of the fact that no substantial policy changes occurred 
either on the ground in Libya or in the domestic political space which could have shaped 
the dynamics of the intervention. Perhaps, the paper was referring to a general 
improvement in conditions among civilians who had been targeted for weeks by pro-
regime forces.  
Finally, The Washington Post publishes its last editorial on the Libyan issue 
within the prescribed time frame. In this piece, the paper loosely addresses the question 
of credibility by describing the interests of Great Britain, France, and the United States in 
Libya and how this is creating conflict within the alliance. Intimating that French 
President Sarkozy’s continue appeals for additional U.S. military assistance is falling on 
deaf ears with President Obama, the paper chronicles how internal divisions within the 
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coalition has led to opposing policy aims in Libya. This assessment appears to draw on 
past examples of how an undisciplined coalition with different policy aims created poor 
leadership throughout the NATO operation to date.  
Most notably, The Wall Street Journal’s editorial coverage of U.S. military action 
in the Libyan crisis addresses questions of credibility in the context of U.S. economic 
interests. Having said that, editorial positions are not solely confined to the economic 
implications of the political turmoil within the Arab Maghreb. For example, on February 
26, 2011, The Wall Street Journal publishes a piece suggesting that France could be 
outflanking the U.S. in a Berlin-esque march towards Tripoli to protect protesters from a 
regime crackdown.46 Yet, it is roughly ten days later that the Journal advocates for a 
more direct U.S. response to the deteriorating situation in Libya. In a piece titled 
“Obama’s Libyan Abdication,” the Journal challenges the administration to meet the 
democratic ideals set out by the newly formed National Transitional Temporary Council 
with a more lenient approach towards arms transfers among rebel groups opposing 
Gaddafi.47 The New York-based financial publication suggests that the arms embargo 
established by U.N.S.C. 1973 should only apply to the Gaddafi regime. In this sense, the 
paper is arguing a policy goal of tipping the military balance in favor of the rebel groups.  
In a similar fashion, on March 12, the paper reports that the ambiguous language 
of the U.N. arms embargo affords sufficient legal latitude for the western coalition to 
only recognize it as applying to the Gaddafi regime. In this piece, The Wall Street 
Journal also reports that NATO was involved in “a series of conversations about a wide 
range of options” given the U.N. mandate and whether these provisions applied to all 
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parties in the Libyan conflict.48 Much as the Washington Post reports on the possibility of 
a military stalemate in the event that the U.S. and NATO fall short of supporting the rebel 
groups in eastern Libya, the Journal writes that the danger of a coalition style campaign 
is the opportunity Gaddafi might see in exploiting the political and economic divisions 
within the international partnership. As the paper contends, this runs the risk of leaving 
Gaddafi in power in the event that no credible opposition group emerges.49 Unlike the 
other two publications referenced in this work, The Wall Street Journal is the only paper 
that devotes an entire editorial to the danger of an indefinite military campaign adding to 
the U.S. national deficit. 
In an editorial on March 29, 2011, the paper suggests that while segments of the 
electorate are unhappy with President Obama bowing to the international community, 
others express frustration with another foreign intervention on the heels of Iraq and 
Afghanistan.50  However, this sentiment is balanced by an editorial on April 4, 2011, 
which presents the risks if the United States fails to pick a side in the Arab revolt. 
Providing the example of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and the security challenges 
posed to the United States, The Wall Street Journal makes clear that a coherent policy of 
military partnership and investment with rebel groups is preferable to inconsistent 
action.51 This critique that the Obama administration is participating in the military 
campaign out of international peer pressure without any desire to pick winners and losers 
in the conflict is reflected in an April 22, 2011 piece. In a final editorial report, entitled 
“Coalition of the Ambivalent,” the Journal claims that while Great Britain and France are 
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supporting the rebels headquartered in Benghazi, the U.S. has only authorized a paltry 
$25 million in direct support to rebel groups.52 However, these figures do not take into 
account the previous campaign directed solely by the U.S. before operational 
responsibility was fully transferred to NATO. In the final analysis, The Wall Street 
Journal editorials within the aforementioned time frame set out to present an alternative 
policy approach with more specificity compared to either The New York Times or The 
Washington Post. However, The Wall Street Journal also expresses a greater degree of 
frustration with implementing a Middle East strategy that can appropriately account for 
the economic implications of further military engagement in Libya.  
LIBYA IN REVIEW: POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The geopolitical consequences of the 2011 Libyan intervention are relevant to 
questions concerning political credibility. First, the instability created by bringing down 
Gaddafi’s regime has “recklessly uncorked” Libya to a flood of refugees and economic 
migrants who are now escaping into Europe (Friedman 2016). The implications of this 
phenomenon are worthy of additional research. As of March 2018, the long-enduring 
allegations that Gaddafi funded former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s political 
campaigns has led to the opening of a formal investigation in France. Sarkozy denies any 
wrongdoing.  
The U.S. military intervention in Libya not only exposed divisions within the 
American alliance system but produced domestic political consequences for President 
Obama that had far reaching implications for the American political landscape. The 
political significance of the Libyan intervention raised questions of judgement as to 
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whether the president’s foreign policy lacked coherence in a world of complicated 
partnerships and alliances in the Arab region. As academic and media coverage 
demonstrates, the liberal interventionists within the administration and foreign policy 
establishment identified the president’s foreign policy realism as a threat to future 
American support for intervening in and preventing humanitarian disasters (Goldberg 
2016). Towards this end, the credibility problem for President Obama was located within 
elite foreign policy circles who maintained a preference for military action despite his 
broader military disengagement in the region. Yet, the greatest domestic political 
consequence of the Libyan intervention was perhaps the congressional investigations into 
the 2012 Benghazi attacks on a U.S. diplomatic and intelligence outpost in eastern Libya. 
The investigation, under the authority of the House Select Committee on Benghazi, 
demanded that the State Department turn over all of Clinton’s emails to see “what she 
and others knew about the deadly attack in Libya and the response by the U.S. 
government” (O’Harrow 2016). However, the State Department held no collection of 
emails from Clinton’s tenure as the nation’s top diplomat. In the process of seeking to 
obtain communications relevant to the Benghazi investigation, the Select Committee 
uncovered Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server. The degree to which this 
discovery upended the domestic political environment as Democratic and Republican 
candidates began heading into the 2016 presidential primaries cannot be overstated. 
Clinton’s tenure at the State Department was supposed to be central to her rationale for 
running for president. 
As polling shows, the Benghazi committee’s uncovering of security failures in 
Libya damaged Secretary Clinton’s credibility and the meticulously cultivated image of 
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her as a capable foreign policy actor (Simendinger 2016). The perception that Clinton 
was dissembling in the immediate aftermath of the Benghazi attacks and throughout the 
early part of her presidential bid as it relates to the emails concerning Libya fed into 
concerns that Clinton lacked the political credibility to be president (Simendinger 2016). 
Yet, in retrospect, Hillary Clinton’s political vulnerability did not seem to impact 
President Obama’s political fortunes. President Obama won re-election in November 
2012 (roughly two months after the Benghazi attacks) despite this issue hanging over the 
race.  
The media is an essential component in investigating and, ultimately, judging 
potential credibility issues. In the wake of the Libyan intervention, the editorial sections 
of the three main news publishers were, at times, openly cheering for an American 
military role in ousting Gaddafi. While criticism existed of the Obama administration 
policy in Libya, it generally towed the liberal interventionist line and requested a 
comprehensive plan for removing Gaddafi and restoring stability in Libya. In this sense, 
there was not a substantial amount of editorial coverage that questioned America’s 
fundamental interests in Libya.  
In a broader sense, the central credibility question for Obama was located outside 
the realm of public opinion. Among foreign policy actors, the suspicion that something 
went awfully wrong in Libya produced questions as to why a presidential administration 
dedicated to restoring stability in the Middle East would launch an intervention that 
resembled a classic regime change operation. Consequently, this type of scrutiny 
compromises a fundamental pillar of political credibility, which is the ability of a 
president to maintain believability in his policy actions.  
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CONCLUSION/FINDINGS 
While no universal truths regarding presidential credibility were captured in this 
project, it can be asserted that presidents do face political consequences, sometimes 
devastating consequences, for misleading the American public. Yet, the severity of the 
political implications that presidents are confronted with are often shaped by how clear 
the potential credibility problem is for the public to digest. In the case of George H.W. 
Bush and “no new taxes,” the clarity of his broken promise in terms of how the American 
public perceived it along with his previous statements on the subject made it impossible 
for him to escape the fall out. Moreover, the political price that Bush paid was much 
easier to determine based on the fact that both a primary challenger as well as Bush’s 
general election opponent in the ’92 campaign repeatedly used his broken promise 
against him. Bush lost his re-election bid in large part because of this broken promise. 
While raising taxes in 1991 was arguably good policy in that it restored fiscal discipline 
to the federal budget process, Bush undermined his own credibility with the conservative 
base that elected him.  
 
President Obama’s policy in Libya is different. The complexity of the struggle 
inside Libya and the speed at which the conflict was developing on the ground changed 
the political calculus for President Obama and the western alliance. While the president 
campaigned on an anti-war platform in Iraq, the intensity of the emerging threat on the 
ground, principally the danger Gaddafi posed to civilians, tipped the scale in favor of a 
U.S. led intervention. While President Obama favored a foreign policy that reduced 
America’s investment in the Middle East and Arab world, he also understood that the 
United States needed to defend certain values. Sometimes, this required the use of 
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military force. In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Bedouin Libyan dictator 
appeared as though he would systematically butcher his own people if it preserved his 
hold on power. In addition, the pressure that Great Britain and France were putting on the 
Obama administration to get involved in the conflict was enormous and, arguably, 
decisive.  
 
Furthermore, as polling shows, while the majority of American voters opposed 
another foreign intervention on the heels of Iraq and Afghanistan, they did not see 
Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya as constituting a credibility problem. Rather, a 
sense that the U.S. policy in Libya was deceptively sold to the public as humanitarian 
relief was almost exclusively located within the confines of foreign policy and political 
circles. A part of this elite group viewed the military intervention through the lens of 
regime change. As Gaddafi was ultimately dethroned and subsequently killed in October 
2011, the suspicion among foreign policy realists was only hardened that liberal 
interventionists seized on the humanitarian crisis in Libya as a way to take down an 
adversarial ruler. Yet, this cannot be considered a credibility issue in the same way as 
Bush’s broken promise. First, President Obama won re-election in 2012 even after the 
explosive events in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, which left a U.S. ambassador 
killed. Secondly, the majority of voters did not perceive the Libyan issue with the same 
intensity as experts and political insiders who opposed the intervention. In the last 
analysis, the notion that Obama’s credibility was damaged as a result of the faulty pretext 
for an American intervention in Libya was not widely shared among voters even though a 
substantial portion of them opposed another war in the region. By applying these 
standards, one can conclude that President Obama’s credibility problem was limited.  
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In both cases, the press played a significant role in deciding how the issues would 
be framed for the public. During a content analysis of the editorial positions of the three 
main American news publishers, it was observed that the press often maintained a 
consistent position on the issues that, at times, became part of the story. In some 
instances, both Presidents Bush and Obama responded to the press coverage that “no new 
taxes” or the U.S. intervention was receiving, respectively. In short, the media was 
fundamental in deciding how possible credibility issues were relayed to the public. Yet, 
despite the negative reaction that the media would sometimes receive based on their 
coverage, this component of the democratic process worked to keep the American public 
informed on presidential policies and actions in both case studies described above. At a 
fundamental level, credibility can only be accurately measured by an informed citizenry. 
Towards this end, one can reasonably conclude that without a strong and independent 
press, the ability of the American public to understand the credibility issues facing a 
president are greatly diminished.  
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